Merit Is Destiny: India can reap its democratic dividend only by harnessing its talent

IN THE GRAND NARRATIVE of India’s rise, few phrases are invoked as often, and with as much bragging rights, as our “demographic dividend”. With a median age of 29 and a vast working-age population, we are told that sheer numbers will propel us into the front ranks of global powers. Yet this fixation on headcount obscures a deeper, more profound asset, what I would call our democratic dividend.

Let me try to define it. ‘Democratic dividend’ refers to the advantages of being a large, diverse, free country with an ancient civilisational history and identity. In our case, it can easily operate in conjunction with the much-vaunted, aforementioned demographic dividend.

But here’s the problem: we seem actively and assiduously working to reduce rather than augment our democratic dividend. The fact that it is rarely discussed with the seriousness it deserves, let alone properly understood, only goes to prove my point.

Our political culture seems to promote a tightly controlled, top-down, personality-centric apparatus. It does not favour open debate and discussions, let alone positive or constructive criticism.

This, in turn, has polarised the public sphere into supporters and opponents of the regime, thereby reducing the generation and dissemination of good ideas and solutions to our numerous problems and challenges. Despite nation-first ideological posturing, it seems that we are a party-first polity and me-first society, with everyone out for themselves. Where is the collective responsibility, let alone pride and ownership of our cities, towns, and villages?

At the national level, there is a dearth of good ideas though we are far from deficient in competent, even brilliant, individuals. How many think-tanks of repute do we have in India? I hazard that we can count them on the fingers of one hand. And these few are so government-aligned that all they can do is function not even as sounding boards but echo chambers.

Instead of think-tanks, we are plagued—yes, I use that word advisedly—by a plethora of NGOs. According to the govern­ment’s Darpan portal, there are some 1.87 lakh registered NGOs. Obviously, there are several tens of thousands that are unregis­tered too. These Non-Governmental Organisations, instead of being genuine do-gooders, are, more often than not, self-serving, limited beneficiary bodies.

Worse, several thousands of them are fronts for foreign-funded missionary or influencer-type organisations, with dubious credentials and antecedents. Of course, the tightening of the Foreign Currency (Regulations) Act (FCRA) has indeed served as a brake or deterrent. But given the strong pushback by church organisations, some of its stiffest provisions are now under review.

Our democratic dividend, I submit, is not an abstract ideal. It is the lived reality of a nation that has sustained the world’s largest democracy for nearly eight decades, navigated extraordinary linguistic, religious, and regional diversity, and drawn upon a civilisational memory stretching back millennia.

Unlike authoritarian monocultures, India’s democracy allows for contestation, correction, and innovation from below. It aligns with the classical Indian empha­sis on sabha and samiti from times immemorial. These deliberative assemblies offered a natural counter to the centralised command models that have repeatedly faltered in history.

Yet today, we seem strangely reluctant to harness these democratic traditions. Despite claiming to be the ‘Mother of Democracy’.

Our ambition to become a global power, I would argue, is obstructed by our in­ability or unwillingness to enhance and encash our democratic dividend. Moreover, without systemic transformation, there is a serious risk that our aspirations will not be nourished by our realities.

Instead of leveraging our demographic dividend, the strengths of open debate, federal pluralism, and accountable governance rooted in our dharmic continuum, what do we do?

I suggest that we remain distracted by two debilitating syndromes. I have labelled them ‘China envy’ and ‘US gripe’.

The mirage of ‘China envy’ manifests as a longing for a single leader, single party, centralised command, and a disciplined or, worse, authoritarian state. But do we really want, even if we can, to be a country where the line between state and civil society dissolves? I think not.

In this imagined utopia, decisions are swift, infrastructure rises overnight, and dissent is efficiently managed. We forget, often wilfully, that China’s model, for all its surface discipline, is not for us. Not only because we are so unlike, but because it may not even work for China in the long run. I am not convinced that the Chinese populace at large is entirely happy with the ruthless regime run by CCP princelings and oligarchs.The system’s much-vaunted efficiency has produced spectacular failures too: a real-estate crisis that has erased trillions in household wealth, youth unemployment hover­ing near 17-20 per cent even with adjusted metrics, and a demographic collapse accelerated by decades of authoritarian social engineering.

Some warn of China’s lost, even last, generation. Many in China, especially the young, long for a freer society better integrated with the world and not at all locked into Cold War 2.0 with the West.

India’s own experiments with centralised control, whether in the Licence Raj era or more recent impulses towards over-regulation, have shown the limits of top-down fiat. Our China envy blinds us to the quiet strengths of our democratic messiness.

Federalism, for all its inefficiencies, allows state-level experi­mentation: Gujarat’s industrial model, Tamil Nadu’s human development focus, or Karnataka’s tech ecosystem. These are not imposed from Delhi but emerge through competitive politics and civil society pressure. A single-party authoritarian state would likely stifle such regional vitality, just as it has suppressed genuine innovation in China beyond state-directed sectors.

Worse, our China envy leads us into a structural ‘medioc­racy’, the rule of the middling and incompetent. Entrenched interests, whether bureaucratic, political, or caste-based, resist genuine efficiency-based selection. Performance is too often subordinated to loyalty, connections, or identity quotas that, while addressing historical inequities, frequently entrench new forms of exclusion.

The result is a governance culture where narrative manage­ment substitutes for outcomes. Grand schemes are announced with fanfare; implementation falters amid leaks, delays, and corruption scandals. We celebrate infrastructure projects while glossing over maintenance failures and cost overruns that would be unacceptable in a truly meritocratic system.

NOW, LET US CONSIDER our ‘US Gripe’ and its dis­contents. We have a resentful grudge against American power. We criticise its unabashed projection across global theatres, its naked celebration of capitalism and wealth creation, and its meritocratic ideal that rewards talent irrespective of origins.

But we also excoriate the present US administration for tightening immigration controls, especially its perceived anti-Indian student and techie policies. We criticise the US way of life but also complain when the best of our youth is blocked from reaching its shores.

How can we have it both ways?

On the one hand, we crave the very outcomes the US system produces. Indian professionals lead Microsoft, Google, Adobe, IBM, and numerous Fortune 500 firms. Satya Nadella, Sundar Pichai, Shantanu Narayen, and Arvind Krishna exem­plify the American capacity to harness global talent.

But this success is also an admission of our failures. It highlights India’s brain drain: hundreds of thousands of highly skilled Indians migrate annually, with over 13 lakh renouncing citizenship in the last decade. IIT graduates, doctors, engineers, and researchers flock to the US for better incentives, research funding, and rules-based systems.

We depend on remittances from abroad, over $100 billion annually, but these represent a massive loss of human capital. We resent America’s ‘pull’ while refusing to create comparable counter-push with domestic opportunities.

The very closure of this lucrative out-of-India pipeline of talent is now being seen as an unfair setback to our aspiring middle classes.

At home, Indian society remains fractured by caste, com­munity, language, and regional loyalties. Special interest groups guard privileges jealously. Regulatory thickets, opaque bureau­cracies, and uneven enforcement deter risk-taking and long-term investment. Capital flees to friendlier jurisdictions; talent follows.

The US, for all its polarisation, maintains an ecosystem where ideas, capital, and ambition converge with relative fluidity. Our gripe reveals a deeper discomfort: admiration mixed with the grudging admission that our system, despite liberalisation, is un­able to operationalise classical pragmatism effectively.

This anti-US resentment weakens us. A mature strategic partnership with the US—transactional, interest-based, and mutually reinforcing—requires shedding both sentimental anti-Westernism and uncritical mimicry. True decolonisation of the Indian mind means adopting what works: incentives for excellence, protection of property rights, and openness to talent, while grounding reforms in our civilisational ethos of pluralism and ethical governance.

Narendra Modi’s ascent to the head of government in 2014 signalled a welcome shift towards decisive leadership, infra­structure push and digital public goods. UPI, Aadhaar-linked services, and global assertiveness, Jan Dhan accounts, massive toilet-building initiatives, to mention only a few new schemes, seemed like genuine game-changers.

But 12 years after—and a record of the longest term as a continuously elected prime minister—we seem to be staring at a stasis and, despite spectacular electoral victories, a rising mur­mur of anti-incumbency. Even if we call these pesky naysayers “cockroaches”, I am not sure we can stamp them out all that easily. Cockroaches, we might remember, are tremendously resilient creatures.

What should we do?

I think we must start by fostering a culture in which talent is recognised, respected, and rewarded. Talent, not deprivation. Not caste. Not some other identity marker.

At the heart of India’s thwarted talent revolution would be reform in education. But our education system is strangulated by reservations in the public and profiteering in the private sectors. Luckily, here is where demographic and democratic dividends converge, at least for now. Despite whatever hamstrings us, the existing talent pool is so large that we can still operationalise it.

Lateral movement in all spheres or, should we coin a new phrase, a special meritorious fast-track for genuine problem-solving may be in order. In addition to the present rent-seeking and sinecure system. But this shift needs fundamental struc­tural and economic reforms too. We can’t just vaunt Indian exceptionalism or civilisational uniqueness.

Narrative management, after all, has limits. Social media tri­umphs and muscular diplomacy cannot mask governance short­falls in employment, healthcare, or law and order. Our ancient civilisation thrived on vidya (knowledge) and kaushal (skill in action), not mere rhetoric. A pragmatic Hindutva, another term for cultural self-confidence, must translate into state capacity. Hard power, institutional resilience, and economic competitive­ness are far more important in the real world than sentimental nationalism, whether in its majoritarian or victimhood variants.

India’s democracy, for all its flaws, provides the arena for these reforms. Competitive federalism, judicial oversight, and vibrant if noisy civil society are assets, not liabilities. They allow course correction without the violent ruptures common in authoritarian systems. The challenge is to liberate our enor­mous talent pool from the shackles of entrenched politics and incentivise excellence across domains.

INDIA STANDS AT A CROSSROADS. Our democratic dividend, deriving from pluralism, openness, and civilisation­al depth, offers a unique pathway to greatness distinct from both Chinese authoritarianism and Western individualism. But realising it demands unsentimental pragmatism: US-style incen­tives for talent, Arthashastra-inspired pragmatic statecraft, and a refusal to let narrative control eclipse substance.

Also, let’s face it. We have so much to learn from Chinese ef­ficiency, hard work, accountability, combined with responsible citizenry. And from the Americans too: not just bold inventive­ness and innovation but genuine respect for and encourage­ment of talent and competence.

Declinists and sycophants may counsel accommoda­tion with rising authoritarianism, but India’s interests lie in strengthening alliances with free societies that value compe­tence. A resurgent, competent India partnering with a renew­ing America can enlarge the sphere of ordered liberty and check revisionist ambitions.

Our democracy is not a burden to be endured but a dividend wait­ing to be claimed. The civilisational stakes could not be higher. Only by embracing competence, accountability, and pragmatic reform can we claim our rightful place among the world’s leading powers. Not through nostalgia or centralised authority, but through the living, multifaceted strength of our ancient yet modern republic.