A Thick Red Line

 FOR THE LAST few years, the port of Duqm on the Oman coast has become an increasingly important destination for Indian naval vessels deployed in the waters from the Gulf of Oman to the Horn of Africa. Offering a vantage point to the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy’s maintenance, logistics, anti-piracy, and humanitarian assistance operations got an edge with the allocation of the dedicated zone at Duqm in February 2024 soon after Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, who became monarch after the long reign of Sultan Qaboos, met Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India in late 2023. The breakthrough provided the Navy a perch overlooking sea lanes criss-crossing the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, cementing its position as the “preferred” security partner for nations in the Gulf and East Africa.

The foothold in Oman provides a strategic counter to the Chinese naval base in Djibouti. The base in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden corridor can host a flotilla and help secure trade routes that deliver Africa’s natural resources to China. Set up in 2017 to curb piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the threat has long subsided but the Chinese presence is now permanent. China is not the only external factor in the region with the US having established Camp Lemonnier, also in Djibouti, in 2002. The Chinese and American rivalry in the Indo-Pacific is spilling over into the Gulf waters as well with the US keen to protect its long-term interests. Yet, even as China and the US keep a wary watch on each other, Indian naval vessels are frequent visitors to ports in the vast Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The Duqm base reinforces India’s access to Salala, also located in Oman and used to sup­port logistical operations, Mombasa in Kenya, and Mauritius. The vast seas between India’s west coast to East Africa and from the Gulf down to Madagascar are now a backyard where Indian naval ships are a frequent and familiar sight.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks during a visit to Bhuj on October 2 on the occasion of Vijayadashami that the “road” to Karachi runs through Sir Creek (see map), a marshy area subject to a border dispute, was a strategic signal and not merely a response to reports of a Pakistani military build-up in areas proximate to the creek. “The way Pakistan has increased its military infrastructure in the Sir Creek area is a pointer to its intentions. If Pakistan commits a folly in the area of Sir Creek it  

 will receive such a strong response that history and geography will both be altered,” Singh said and added that the Indian Army had reached Lahore in the 1965 war.

“In 2025, Pakistan should remember that one road to Karachi runs from Sir Creek,” Singh said. The reference to Karachi’s vul­nerability was an obvious reminder of the Indian Navy’s success­ful bottling up of the Pakistani navy during the May 7-10 conflict. But it was not just that. The defence minister’s pointed comments reflect a new confidence rising from India’s enlarged influence in the IOR.

Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi removed any doubts about the messaging when he told troops in Sri Ganganagar, a border district in Rajasthan, the next day to be ready for action. “I want to tell you that India is fully ready and will not exhibit the restraint shown in Operation Sindoor 1.0 …we will undertake such action that Pakistan may have to think whether it wants to be part of history and geography,” General Dwivedi said. Despite their predictable bluster, the generals in Rawalpindi had been given plenty to chew on.

“The Sir Creek area does not permit large movement of troops. The threat can lie in small groups infiltrating and seeking to hit targets in India. The defence minister’s statement about the road to Karachi can be a reminder that the distance by sea from Bhuj is less than 350km,” Commodore (retired) Abhay Kumar Singh, research fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) told Open.

The advances in India’s na­val capabilities have meant that no more than half the western fleet is required to address the challenge posed by the Pakistan navy. Pakistan’s current disad­vantages due to submarines being under maintenance or limitations of Mirage 5 fight­ers might be mitigated to an extent with Chinese assistance but the balance is unlikely to be much altered. “The mari­time geography of Pakistan is such that it does not favour the country. The defence minister’s statement on Sir Creek was in­tended as deterrence against the temptation to misuse the porosity of the area,” said Singh.

There are significant eco­nomic assets in Bhuj and Jamnagar and the minister’s remarks might indicate the assessment that India has taken into account that some of Pakistani military activities have happened after Operation Sindoor and might be spurred by considerations such as its new­found proximity to the Trump administration and a perceived downturn in India-US ties.

THE CREEK ITSELF is a 96km tidal estuary and the dis­pute is over where exactly the international boundary lies. India has held that in keeping with conventions on such boundaries, the line should run through the median line of the es­tuary or follow the thalweg principle, which is the navigable path. Pakistan rejects these arguments and wants the eastern bank of the estuary to form the international boundary. The contending positions are not marked by significant distances but have a bear­ing on where the international boundary will run in the open sea past the mouth of the creek. Interestingly, the international boundary that runs due east-north-east in a zigzag from Sir Creek was settled after international arbitration following the 1965 war. The arbitration award rejected Pakistan’s claims over swathes of land under control but granted roughly 10 per cent of its claims to the west of Shakoor Lake. The readjusted boundary now features two small abutments conceded by India.

While the boundary claims go back to a 1914 Bombay Govern­ment Resolution that lends itself to varying interpretations, it is telling that though the resolution of the dispute was seen as far more “doable” than other flashpoints like the Siachen Glacier, efforts to reach an understanding failed. There are reports that a deal was discussed during the tenure of Pervez Musharraf and later when the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was in office. The efforts were part of the Manmohan Singh government’s bid to “compartmentalise” the disputes with Pakistan and were essen­tially derailed due to an inadequate understanding of Pakistan’s internal dynamics and the hostility of its elites, both civilian and military, towards India. In any case, the 26/11 Mumbai attacks put paid to any hope of progress and the Narendra Modi government, once its initial efforts to improve relations failed, made action against terrorism the prerequisite for normalisation of relations with Pakistan. Operation Sindoor, launched in retaliation against the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist attack, has etched the line more deeply. Singh’s remarks at a military garrison at Bhuj were care­fully crafted as was evident from the care the minister took to consult a note.

The defence minister’s Karachi reference and General Dwivedi’s terse comments are unmistakable warning shots and not posturing. They articulate post-Operation Sindoor war-gam­ing that envisages the possible engagement of land troops and a thrust into Pakistan-held territory. It has been left to Pakistan’s military to mull over what the next Indian reaction to a terror attack or an injudicious military manoeuvre could be. There is a view among military planners in India that border engagements could become unavoidable if Pakistan does not desist from using terror groups as instruments of state policy. There are inherent risks in the likely escalation in contrast to the air-launched strikes on terror sites and Pakistani air force bases during Operation Sin­door but the preparedness to up the ante is evidence that India is not willing to succumb to nuclear sabre-rattling.

This is a crucial issue as opinion in Pakistan seems to have convinced itself that nuclear weapons prevented India from ex­panding its military action. Political and military leaders in India, beginning with the prime minister, have warned Pakistan against such a strategic error and the “road to Karachi” is an evocative way of framing India’s new thinking. The promise of more severe action for future infractions is backed by the increasing severity of retaliation since the 2016 cross-Line of Control (LoC) surgical strikes. In May, the Indian Navy held its position in the Arabian Sea and did not use its carrier-based MiG 29K fighters that possess a significant stand-off capability, or its missile assets, to threaten Pakistan. Next time round, the nature, scale and scope of offensive action may be very different.