The World According to Trump

ON JULY 7, 2025, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution call­ing on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to up­hold human rights and act against terrorism, and expressed concern over the oppression of women. Among the 12 nations that abstained were India and China, a rare convergence, and for New Delhi a shift from the “ayes” column. India had voted in favour of a similar resolution adopted by the UNGA on November 10, 2022. China was even then among 10 abstentions along with North Ko­rea, Pakistan and Russia. There were no opposing votes. This time there were two votes against the resolution—the US and Israel.

On the same day as the UNGA vote on Afghanistan, the Trump administration announced its decision to revoke the terror des­ignation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) headed by Syria’s ruler Ahmed al-Sharaa. A one-time fellow traveller of Al Qaeda and the ISIS (Islamic State), al-Sharaa shrugged off the patronage of his men­tors and in a swift offensive replaced Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The legitimisation of al-Sharaa, who has not disavowed his Salafi beliefs but seems to be ruling with a lighter hand by avoiding measures like forced hijabs and allowing bars in Damascus to serve alcohol, has been in the works. Donald Trump’s meeting with al- Sharaa in May in Riyadh was more than a courtesy call with the US president observing that the HTS leader “had potential.”

Trump’s embrace of al-Sharaa, who despite his current leniency remains an autocratic figure keen to rebuild Syria’s central authori­ty, is just one aspect of the rapidly changing geopolitics in the Middle East. India’s softening towards the Taliban with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar speaking to Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Muttaqi after Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met Muttaqi earlier reflects a similar pragmatic response to India’s security situ­ation. The Taliban regime not only swiftly disabused Pakistan of its daydream of regaining “strategic depth” against India but also upped the ante with border clashes. Pakistan’s forcible return of refugees only made matters worse and India is looking to regain some limited footing in the country where it has poured billions of dollars in building infrastructure and humanitarian aid.

The successful US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have given Trump a new currency in the Middle East. The July 7 statement on HTS might have something to do with reports that US bomb­ers overflew Syrian airspace without any let or hindrance. Hoping to regain influence in the region, Saudi Arabia has backed the overtures to al-Sharaa. While Saudi Arabia maintains silence on Israel, the Saudis are looking ahead to an expansion of the Abraham Accords. Interestingly, in the midst of the hectic action, reports suggest that Türkiye con­sciously adopted a neutral stance as Iran faced the brunt of Israeli and American attacks. Trump’s success in hitting Iran’s nuclear programme, ensuring the war did not escalate and getting the theocrats in Tehran to accept talks has sent his stock soaring in the region and at home. Trump’s decisive actions do stand in contrast to the previous Biden and Obama administrations that failed to curb Iran or its proxies whose continuous hostility towards Israel destabilised the Middle East.

The wind in his sails has encouraged Trump to step up his agenda to impose harsh tariffs on nations that have failed to conclude deals with the US. On July 8, 2025, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt held up a letter to Korean President Lee Jae Myung to announce similar letters to 13 other nations threat­ening higher tariffs if they fail to make concessions by August 1. Myanmar and Laos have been slapped with a rate of 40 per cent. Cambodia and Thailand with 36 per cent, Bangladesh and Serbia with 35 per cent, Indonesia with 32 per cent, Bosnia, Herzegovina and South Africa with 30 per cent, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Tunisia and Kazakhstan with 25 per cent. The letters reflect Trump’s language and his typical social media comments rather than the State Department language. There is capitalisation for effect such as “Trading Relationship,” “Trade Deficit,” “TRADE,” description of the US as the “Number One Market in the World,” “Reciprocal” and “National Security” and the letter ends saying the tariffs may be modified if the recipient nation makes adjustments. “…[deficits] are a major threat to our Economy and, indeed, our National Security!” the letters note dramatically. Distractions of poorly formed sentences aside, the letters are a bid to drive trade deals on Trump’s terms. To what extent they are a negotiating tactic—the possibility cannot be discounted given Trump’s abil­ity to effortlessly switch tracks—remains to be seen.

India does not figure in the list of countries to receive the tariff letters and while there is no official word, the Modi government has conveyed it has made a “fair offer” to the US. The likely deal, which Trump hinted at, could be a “mini package” or the first part of a bigger exercise. The matter will be at the top of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “in tray” when he returns from Namibia after a five-nation tour. Trump has additionally threatened a 10 per cent penalty tariff on BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations, accusing the grouping of trying to undermine the dollar. Sources familiar with the negotiations said the deal needs to meet the standard of reciprocity and respect India’s red lines as regards the farm and dairy sectors. The Modi government is indeed keen to conclude a deal that has consumed a lot of its diplomatic energy but has con­veyed that the US must keep in mind it stands to gain access to a large market. Sealing a deal has benefits for both sides. At the time of going to print, a deal was seen as possible, but needed the last mile political push. Recent interactions be­tween Indian representatives and the State Department and White House saw attempts by US officials to reassure India that it is an indispensable partner. Indian sources point out stalled nego­tiations and any punitive tariffs will impact other aspects of the relationship such as defence sales. If the US is not seen as a consistent partner, already existing misgivings—deepened by Trump playing host to Pakistan’s army chief General Asim Munir—will seem justified.

Trump’s trade blitz has a domestic resonance even as its eco­nomic rationale is debated. American think-tanks have evaluated the merit of leveraging tariffs to boost investment in the US and while they are not dismissing the strategy outright, they point to likely higher costs for American companies, higher retail prices and frayed ties with allies. Trump’s tough talk admittedly strikes a chord with many Americans feeling sidelined and aggrieved by diminished prospects and what they see as an elite condescension. Even before Trump was sworn in, Japanese billionaire Masayoshi Son promised to invest $100 billion and create 100,000 jobs. Other such offers and promises followed and economists have debated that the US president’s strongarm tactics might indeed bring investment back to American shores. But the possible advantages of such a course of actions are less clear than the political gains of agitating a sense of deprivation. The theatrical use of words like “pillage,” “loot” and “plunder” to describe alleged injustices suffered by the US due to unfair trade sits at odds with America’s record as a leader of laissez-faire policies and its claim to the world’s pre-emi­nent power. The vocabulary used seems closer to outpourings of a revisionist power. In his 2015 book, Is the American century over?, the late American political scientist Joseph Nye, credited with coining the term “soft power,” concluded that while US salience has ebbed, its fall is hardly imminent. But while he dismissed the advent of a post-American world, he accepted that the 21st century was differ­ent and the US needs to make smart strategic choices.

BY JUNE-END, China said a trade framework with the US could result in Beijing easing restrictions on rare earth exports while Washington rethinks curbs on chips, jet en­gines and ethane. Some of these measures have fructified and in early July, the US removed restrictions on export of chip design and ethane to China. But to date, there is no final US-China deal. It was during the previous Trump administration that the US embraced the term “Indo-Pacific” and recognised China as a strategic competi­tor and called out its hostile actions such as espionage and intellec­tual property theft apart from trade imbalance. The bad blood has created dilemmas for China’s neighbours, particularly the Associa­tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that has extensive trade links with the communist giant, and it is unclear who is winning. But the July 8 tariff bombs target longstanding US strategic partners South Korea and Japan, an indispensable part of America’s security architecture in Asia. There are dozens of US military bases in both nations intrinsic to a shared commitment to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. At the recent Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore in early June, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth did not mince words in describing China as a security challenge. He spoke of the US move to take back Panama Canal from “malign Chinese influence” and said China will not be allowed to weaponise it. “Deterrence starts in our own backyard,” he said, drawing an angry Chinese reaction ac­cusing Hegseth of levelling provocative allegations intended to sow discord. China was particularly angered by Hegseth’s observation on Taiwan. “Again, to be clear: any attempt by communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world. There’s no reason to sugarcoat it. The threat China poses is real,” he said. China’s response was equally sharp. “The Taiwan question is entirely China’s internal affair. No country is in a position to interfere,” it said.

Reacting to Trump’s tariff letter, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said, “It is deeply regrettable that the US govern­ment has not only imposed additional tariffs but has now also an­nounced a further increase in tariff rates.” But both he and Korean President Myung also said negotiations will continue. A failure to secure trade deals with these two influential nations has serious consequences for the Asia-Pacific. Both Korea and Japan are key parts of a consequential economic and security bulwark against China’s expansionism. Trade frictions between these nations and the US are detrimental to India’s interests. India, too, will have to brace for impact in case trade negotiations do not work out. The dislocation in case the August 1 deadline does not result in trade deals will be immense and may prod affected nations to work on alternative arrangements. Differences, even sharp ones, between partners are not uncommon. But if the US does not come across as a consistent and reliable ally, the price will not be paid by one side alone. In calling the bluff of the fanatical clergy that rules Iran, Trump in one stroke reintroduced the US as the major player in the Middle East, countering the creeping advance of the Iran-Russia- China axis. Trade affronts, real and imagined, weigh heavily on him. But as Nye noted, the “rise of the Rest” cannot be wished away. Trump would do well to recognise who America’s friends are.