Message in a Missile

THE POST ON X (formerly Twitter) was simple: “Proud of our DRDO scientists for Mission Divyas­tra, the first flight of indigenously developed Agni-5 missile with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology.” These words from Prime Minister Narendra Modi signalled a giant leap in India’s defence capabilities. With that, the country became a member of a tiny group of nations with such capability.

Earlier in the day on March 11, the test was carried out from the APJ Abdul Kalam Island off Odisha. An official release said: “Vari­ous Telemetry and radar stations tracked and monitored multiple re-entry vehicles. The Mission accomplished the designed param­eters.” This was the first MIRV-enabled Agni-V missile.

An MIRV-enabled missile carries multiple warheads designed to hit multiple targets. In case of war, a MIRV missile can carry decoys/multiple warheads making it difficult for anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) to eliminate those warheads. This is in contrast to an MRV missile that has multiple warheads but targets only a single location. That is not the only advantage of a MIRV missile. Scientific studies have shown that in case of ‘hardened’ targets, where a single strike by a missile may be ineffective, a MIRV-en­abled missile sees a dramatic increase in the Single Shot Probability of Kill (SSPK). When equipped with a nuclear warhead, this probability turns to near-certainty when the yield of the nuclear weapon crosses a certain threshold.

This Agni-V test comes in a series of other defensive missile tests carried out by India since 2019. This is part-and-parcel of India’s drive to build robust defence systems given that the coun­try finds itself in an extremely hostile neighbourhood to the west, north and east. Even in its southern neighbour­hood, especially the Indian Ocean which was once considered a peaceful zone, India has had to contend with repeated Chinese incursions. It is not a coinci­dence that India’s latest naval base, INS Jatayau, in Lakshadweep is geared to improve the country’s situational awareness in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India’s land, air and sea-based assets are geared to safe­guard its territorial integrity. So will its MIRV missiles.

In a sense the Agni-V MIRV was a missile whose time had come. In the past two decades, India has mastered a series of tech­nologies required to manufacture sophisticated missile systems with ever-increasing range. These efforts have gathered speed in the last five-to-six years. Even a decade ago, MIRV technology was the stuff of dreams. The best part of it all is that India has created and mastered all these technologies indigenously. With increas­ing private-sector participation and a new clutch of defence start­ups, this is just the beginning for a new age of rocketry in India.

The MIRV-enabled Agni-V is a defensive system. the threat that India faces from China is multi-dimensional. Yet, in the midst of relations that have continued to deteriorate, India has argued for peace while not desisting from a defensive build-up

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The development and testing of an MIRV Agni-V missile ought to be seen as parallel to India’s nuclear strategy as it has evolved over time. When India published its official nuclear doc­trine in January 2003, nearly five years after conducting nuclear tests in 1998, it was a bare-bones document. The doctrine talked about “building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent”. But merely saying that India’s deterrent would be “credible” goes nowhere. In 2003, India’s ability to carry out nuclear strikes in case it was subjected to a nuclear attack was, to put it mildly, rudimentary at best. India did not possess long-range missiles, submarines that could launch Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), let alone nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). What it possessed in the name of a delivery vehicle were jerry-rigged aircraft. This was hardly a deterrent against Pakistan and certainly not against a first-rate military power like China.

These capabilities were built painfully slowly over the next two decades. India acquired its first SSBN INS Arihant that was opera­tionalised only in 2016. But again, that is just a submarine: its array of SLBMs—the K-4 and K-5, with ranges of 4,000km and 5,000km— are yet to be integrated (K-4) or are still in the developmental stages. Further, a single SSBN is not enough for deterrence. The second SSBN of the Arihant class, INS Arighat, is still undergoing trials. Building a full-complement of delivery platforms is still some distance away.

In this situation, ballistic missiles are an attractive option to strengthen deterrence, especially against China. Reaching the eastern-most parts of China requires that India possess Inter­continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). ICBMs, by definition, have a range greater than 5,500km. The original Agni missile series (I to IV) were, strictly speaking, Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), and as such only partially useful against China. Even Agni-V missiles, of which there have been seven tests since 2012, followed by user trial tests, were not MIRV-enabled. The Mission Divyastra test on March 11 was the first MIRV-enabled Agni-V.

The strategic logic and India’s progress towards MIRV missiles has been noted over the past five-to-eight years by scholars of different persuasion. In 2018, Vipin Narang, professor of political science at MIT and a keen observer of South Asian strategic affairs noted: “…the backbone of India’s assured retaliation capability against China for the foresee­able future will be the longer-range variants of the Agni ballistic missile family. It is in this context that India’s otherwise puzzling march toward MIRV’ing (placing multiple independently targe­table warheads) its Agni V missiles may have a sensible rationale.”

Even earlier, in 2016, two other scholars, Jaganath Sankaran and Rajesh Basrur, noted that India was progressing towards MIRV-enabled ballistic missiles. These scholars looked at the strategic, technological and political reasons for India going ahead with MIRV missiles. Among other factors, they noted: “China’s pursuit of BMD and MIRVing is in itself sufficient cause to push the process along.” China is yet to establish an operational Ballis­tic Missile Defence (BMD) system but even apart from BMD, there are other reasons for going ahead with MIRV-enabled missiles.

THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING of nuclear strategy dates back to the Cold War when it was argued— on good grounds—that nuclear weapons could not be used as weapons in the ordinary sense of the word. This was based on the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) that any nucle­ar attack on a country, followed by that country’s second nuclear strike—in retaliation against the original attack—would lead to mutual annihilation. But through the 1950s till today, all nuclear-armed countries have sought to ‘escape MAD’ by various means. These include the use of ABMs/BMD and the idea of a “limited nuclear war”. To that end, MIRV-laced ballistic missiles serve an important purpose.

In India’s case, the goal is to prevent China ‘escaping MAD’. Conversely, the idea is to strengthen India’s deterrent capabilities.

The goal is to prevent China ‘escaping mutual assured destruction’. Conversely, the idea is to strengthen India’s deterrent capabilities. The Agni-V test is an important first step. If India has to operationalise MIRV missiles, the number of warheads it holds will have to increase

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The Agni-V test is an important first step in that direction. The missile is still far from being operationally integrated with India’s defences. For starters, it will take multiple rounds of further test­ing before even user trials can be conducted. Then there is the issue of the number of nuclear warheads that India currently possesses. For 2023, the Arms Control Association, a US-based organisation, estimated that India had 164 nuclear warheads, slightly below the 170 estimated for Pakistan and considerably less than the 410 estimated for China. For India, this estimate has remained constant for a while. Until now, this has been consistent with India’s stance of “credible minimum deterrent”, but if at some point it has to operationalise MIRV-enabled missiles, the number of warheads it holds will have to increase.

At different points, Indian officials have made a plea for “doc­trinal flexibility”, deviating from the 2003 doctrine. This, in turn, has led to speculation that India may be moving towards a ‘coun­terforce’ strategy. In nukespeak, a counterforce strategy targets an enemy country’s military infrastructure and its weapons sys­tems, for example, its missiles and nuclear weapons. In contrast, a ‘counter-value’ strategy is less discriminating and ends up targeting civilians, industrial infrastructure and cities among other targets. This assertion is based on India developing an array of surveillance systems and a variety of missile systems over the past 15 years and especially in the last five. In November 2022, India tested its AD-1 interceptor missile which is part of its BMD system and supposedly marks the testing of all the components of its BMD system. In 2019, India had tested an anti-satellite missile system. These are held to be pointers towards India seeking counterforce capabilities.

The reality is different. For one, India is a peaceful country that has never started a conflict with any of its neighbours. For another, India’s strategic thought is reactive: it tends to respond to events instead of trying to pre-empt dangers. The Agni-V programme is a case in point. After seven tests spread over more than a decade and user trials, the missile system is yet to be integrated with the arsenal of its armed forces. During this time, India’s relations with China have nosedived to the point that there have been two out­right hostile encounters in 2017 and in 2020 and hundreds of other incidents with that country. By the government’s own admission, relations with China are “tense” and “dangerous”—as Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar said on March 11 at an event in Delhi—and yet India has not undertaken any out-of-line military build-up beyond what is essential for defensive purposes.

The MIRV-enabled Agni-V is purely a defensive system. The threat that India faces from China is multi-dimensional—from propping up an enemy state in India’s neighbourhood to attempt­ing salami-slicing tactics on India’s far-flung borders. Yet, in the midst of relations that have continued to deteriorate for nearly a decade, India has constantly argued for peace. India has, however, not desisted from a defensive build-up to ensure its territorial in­tegrity; Agni-V with MIRV capability is geared to that end. It is a weapon of peace and one that sends a signal to China: Do not step over a line you are not permitted to cross.

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Siddharth Singh

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