Gen Chauhan established the credibility of Operation Sindoor

At 1.05 am on the intervening night of May 6-7, India launched aerial attacks on nine terror targets in Pakistan unprecedented in magnitude and technological prowess compared to any previous military retaliation. They went far beyond the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot operation. The precise hits on Jaish and Lashkar nerve centres at Muridke and Bahawalpur fulfilled Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s promise that reprisals for the April 22 Pahalgam terror outrage would be beyond the imagination of Pakistan and its terror proxies.

In planning and executing the attacks that involved a mix of drones and missiles, the Indian military dealt with several unknowns. India was testing for the first time the full range of Pakistani air defence systems on high alert all along the western border and also preparing for hostile reactions that could include ground movement of Pakistani units towards the LoC and the international border. Not since the action during the 1971 war had India initiated an air attack on such a scale.

Chief of Defence Staff Lt Gen Anil Chauhan’s interview to Bloomberg TV in Singapore on May 31 that “tactical mistakes” were rectified and the Indian air force resumed operations in two days with full effect underline the unchartered territory that Operation Sindoor traversed. Gen Chauhan’s comments set at rest fevered speculation about Indian losses and confirmed the quick remedies that saw Pakistan air force bases from Skardu in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to Bholari in Sindh being hit with full force on May 10.

Mid-Course Correction

As Gen Chauhan revealed, the IAF attacks on May 9 and 10 were again at long range like on May 7 but did not suffer losses. “The good part is we were able to understand the tactical mistake which we made, remedied, rectified, and then implement it again after two days and flew all our jets again targeting at long range,” Gen Chauhan said. In fact, the tactics had to be devised on the go. There was no precedent to draw on and Indian military planners did well to swiftly apply the correctives.

In an address a few days later in Pune, Gen Chauhan spelt out the dramatic sequence of events when Pakistan felt it could launch a decisive attack on India on the night of May 9-10. But India’s response saw missiles – with Brahmos playing a stellar role – slamming into Pakistani air bases like Nur Khan which is not far from the Pakistan army GHQ of Rawalpindi – put paid to the plans. This time, as Gen Chauhan said, IAF fully utilised its jets and there were no losses. The lesson of May 7 had been internalised and strategies finetuned to ensure stand-off attacks continued.

The debate over Gen Chauhan’s remarks, with some commentators arguing the comments resulted in a narrative “equivalence” with Pakistan, miss several important points. For one, the international military and strategic community gathered at Singapore for the Shangri La dialogue the CDS was attending would be largely aware of the May 7-10 events including an estimate of hardware lost. To keep denying losses would hurt the credibility of Indian accounts of the conflict. He explained the “unknown unknowns” that need to be faced and countered despite meticulous planning.

Pak never acknowledges losses

Pakistan has a time-honoured tradition of not acknowledging losses of men and machines. The Indian army carried out burials with religious rights of Pakistani army personnel killed in the 1999 Kargil war as Pakistan refused to accept the bodies despite recovery of identification tags, personal letters and insignia. India cannot act in similar fashion and during Operation Sindoor briefings the IAF confirmed all pilots were back home while saying losses are part of combat. The CDS shed important light on the events and strengthened the accuracy and integrity of India’s account of the short but sharp exchange.

On the night of May 9-10 Pakistan significantly escalated hostilities, attacking 26 Indian civilian and military targets. The Pakistan military had no confirmation of success while on the other hand India struck hard at air bases like Rafiqui, Chaklala, Rahim Yar Khan, Nur Khan, Sukkur and Chunian as also radar sites at Pasrur and Sialkot. By lifting the fog of speculation, Gen Chauhan established a credible chain of events and provided the context for the May 7-10 events.

Military mandate

Warfare analysts argue the initial strikes on Pakistani terror camps executed a mandate not to target military facilities and this meant efforts were not made to suppress Pakistani air defence. This might be the case but in any event Operation Sindoor was a first and lacked any precedent. It was a case of learning by doing and Gen Chauhan and the military brass delivered the goods. On May 10 morning, Indian Army director general of military operations Lt Gen Rajiv Ghai received word that his Pakistani counterpart wanted to talk. In the end it was the Pakistan DGMO who placed the call.

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