Here Comes the Indian Armada

/8 min read
India steps up its role in policing the Somalia-Arabian Sea zone using state-of-the-art information analytics and deploying missile ships and marine commandos
Here Comes the Indian Armada
An Indian Navy helicopter approaches MV Lila Norfolk, a Liberian bulk carrier, in response to a hijacking distress call from the vessel in the Arabian Sea, January 5, 2024 (Photo: AFP) 

LESS THAN FOUR monthsago, inSeptember2023, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement observed the ninth anniversary of its control of Yemen's capital city of Sanaa with a parade that showcased ballistic and cruise missiles of Iranian origin that have only recently been unveiled by Tehran. One of the mis­siles to be paraded has the potential to strike Israeli territory and one such launch (intercepted by Israel) was reported after the war in Gaza broke out following the Hamas attack on Israel. Other missiles that were part of the Houthi parade had the range to hit targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In a dark turn of phrase, Iran's deadly proxy in Yemen had come of age.

A detailed report of the Houthi armament and its implica­tions published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), titled 'Little and Large Missile Surprises in Sanaa and Tehran', notes that the parade not only confirmed the close ties between the Houthis and Iran but also provided evidence of the improved capacities of medium-range missiles developed by Tehran. A missile named Tankeel, resembling Iran's Zoheir, is one of the most modern solid propellant missiles to be developed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. "[This] demonstrates Iran's willingness to transfer advanced systems to its Yemeni ally. In addition to the regular precision-guided land-attack version of the missile, the Houthi parade also included a previously unseen anti-ship version. If operational, both the anti-ship version of the Tankeel and the previously unveiled Asef, an anti-ship version of the Iranian Fateh with an alleged range of 400km, would enable the Houthis to target shipping in the Red Sea as well as parts of the Gulf of Aden," the IISS report said. The reports and others in a similar vein underlined that the Houthis were no longer the rag-tag fighters who burst on the scene in 2014-15, but a function­al outfit with significant military capacities that is not party to any international treaty or recognised as a legitimate government by most nations. Yet, Houthis had the ability—and the will— to intervene in a wide arc from Gaza to Somalia to the central Arabian Sea at the prompt of their masters in Tehran.

A report by the Gurugram-based Information Fusion Centre- Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) for December 2023 shows a cluster of "hybrid" security threats in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden region. The centre, hosted by the Indian Navy, said most of the incidents were reported off Mokha (Mocha) in Yemen and though an analysis showed a majority of vessels targeted were linked to Israel, some had no such connection. "In incidents of suspicious approaches, vessels transiting through the southern Red Sea have reported being hailed by an unknown entity claiming to be the Yemini navy or coast guard, ordering a change of course to Hodeida (Al Hudaydah) port (not far from the mouth of the Red Sea)," the IFC report said, adding that vessels are advised not to respond and continue their journey expeditiously. It was quite clear that sailing in the sea corridor that connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the busy merchant routes across the Arabian Sea had become a fraught affair. IFC and the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), also based in Gurugram, are key information ag­gregators of near-real-time information on maritime situations. IFC's focus on IOR is crucial given the energy supplies, as well as other trade, that move through the region on way to India and farther east. The centre, according to the IFC website, hosts liaison officers from countries like Japan, Australia, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Singapore, the US, France, the UK, and Italy, helping improve timely and accurate assessments of maritime threats. It also builds capacities to anticipate and counter maritime threats. On December 23 last year, MV Chem Pluto, carrying oil from Saudi Arabia to New Mangalore, was hit by a projectile a little more than 200 nautical miles from Gujarat port of Porbandar. Visuals of the strike showed damage to the ship above the water line, although there were no casualties and the vessel remained seaworthy. In a statement, the Pentagon said the attack was carried out by a "one way" drone fired from Iran. There has been no Indian statement on the likely origins of the explosive-carrying drone.

External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran, January 15, 2024 (Photo: AFP)
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran, January 15, 2024 (Photo: AFP) 

Some days later, on January 4, an Indian naval ship intervened in a hijack situation on board bulk carrier Lila Norfolk, also under a Liberian flag like Chem Pluto, in the Somalia-Arabian Sea area, rescuing the crew comprising several Indians who had managed to secure themselves in the ship's citadel or safe room. The five-six armed hijackers left the ship on approach of the Indian vessel and marine commandos who boarded the carrier. In a statement, the Navy said its personnel had inspected and boarded a large number of fishing and other "vessels of interest" in recent weeks. Accompanied by an increased deployment of guided-missile destroyers, India stepped up interceptions and patrols in the Arabian Sea region, making it evident that it intends to take more proactive steps to enhance security of Indian and other shipping in the sea lanes from Somalia to Gujarat.

The visit of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to Iran on January 15-16 saw him raise concerns about the safety of maritime traffic with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and President Ebrahim Raisi. "As you are all aware, there has also been recently a perceptible increase in threats to the safety of mari­time commercial traffic in this important part of the Indian Ocean. The Minister also referred to it. We have even seen some attacks in the vicinity of India. This is a matter of great concern to the interna­tional community. Obviously, it also has a direct bearing on India's energy and economic interests. This fraught situation is not to the benefit of any party and this must be clearly recognised," the joint statement released after the meeting with Abdollahian said. The Iranian statement after the meeting with Raisi said the president listed stopping Israeli attacks in Gaza, punishing the Zionist state and fulfilling the rights of the Palestinian people as requisites to ensure stability and security in the region. It can be surmised that Jaishankar would have highlighted the risks to shipping and sup­plies bound for India and underlined the dangerous fallout of an escalation in hostilities. Irrespective of whether the situation in Yemen or the Pentagon statement on MV Chem Pluto was men­tioned, India emphasised that maritime security is as important as completion of agreements, such as the Chabahar Port Development Plan that Iran said came up during the Jaishankar-Raisi meeting.

In Tehran, Jaishankar highlighted the risks to shipping and supplies bound for India. India emphasised that maritime security is as important as the completion of agreements, such as the Chabahar Port Development Plan that Iran said came up during the Jaishankar-Raisi meeting

Yet, Iranian missile strikes on targets that it claims were Israeli spy assets in Iraq's Kurdish areas and in northern Syria as well as air attacks inside Pakistan in the Balochistan province against an armed group, Jaish al-Adl, are a new turn for Iran and the wider region. The Iranian embassy in Delhi posted reports of four Khebar-Shekan ballistic missiles targeting terrorist positions in Syria's Idlib and a "Mossad-affiliated centre in Erbil". There was no mention of the bombings in Pakistan, but the foreign ministry in Islamabad condemned the violation of its airspace and the next day said it had carried out retaliatory strikes in Iranian territory on what it called "terrorist hideouts" or Baloch separatists. Iranian channels on Telegram showed rubble in residential areas near the border with Pakistan.

Islamabad is having to consider the bitter lesson that its nucle­ar weapons—long held by the military and Pakistan's elites as the guarantor of national security—do not count for much after all. The generals in Rawalpindi will need to digest the fact that Iran is after all a nation yet to acquire nuclear weapons and is an Islamic republic, even if a Shia one. While India said reports of the Iranian air attacks were a matter between Tehran and Islamabad, it noted nations had the right to act in self-defence. Iran's actions no doubt increase the levels of instability caused by the Israel-Hamas war.

(Graphic: Saurabh Singh)
(Graphic: Saurabh Singh) 

The theocratic state is prepared to up the ante, going beyond acting through its proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. By at­tacking so-called Israeli assets in Iraq, and its pointed reference to a medium-range missile, it is conveying that Israel is not out of reach. Its actions are a challenge for India in as much as they impact the security of sea lanes but the strikes against Pakistan are not unwel­come. Iran's readiness to hit camps in Pakistan borrows a page from India's Balakot operation and, gallingly for Pakistan, happened around the time the Iranian foreign minister was meeting Pakistani caretaker Prime Minister Anwaar ul-Haq Kakar in Davos. From be­ing a crucial patch of geography during the US operations against the Soviets and the Taliban, Pakistan's utility seems to have declined dramatically. The US does not seem to be particularly bothered by the current predicament of its Cold War ally, even though the Pen­tagon may still have a lingering soft corner given its ties to the Paki­stani military. The Iran factor will give Pakistan much to ponder after the increasingly deadly Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan attacks on military personnel and posts in north-west Pakistan.

The Indian operations in the Arabian Sea are at some distance from the Red Sea zone itself and the Modi government has not agreed to be part of the multi-nation naval taskforce the US cob­bled together to counter attacks on shipping. The US-UK strikes on Houthi targets have clearly not dampened Iran's appetite for fights with the West and Israel. This is almost certainly to gain Iran adherents on the Arab street aboil with anger against Israel. Iran's preparedness to join the action puts pressure on Arab leaders in the Middle East who harbour deep reservations about Hamas and other Islamist forces, making them seem ineffective as compared to the Ayatollahs in Tehran. The Indian naval operations are concentrated in the band between Oman and Gujarat (besides the sea adjoining Somalia) and will proactively police the corridors. The step-up by way of deployment of destroyers, surveillance aircraft, and helicop­ters in the deep sea and coast guard closer home is complemented by a deepening cooperation with other nations with a shared inter­est in securing sea lanes and deterring Iran's adventurism. From a more background role India is set to be a more overt security pro­vider going by the Navy's decision to physically check likely pirate vessels and the deployment of commandos on destroyers that are "mission deployed" in the region. India has always been a net secu­rity provider in IOR. That role is set to be enhanced and expansion plans of the Navy hopefully include a third aircraft carrier that will provide the punch for the role.