Tweaking the Modi Doctrine

 THE CUSTOMARY WAY TO UNDERSTAND India’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is as a journey from non-alignment to strategic autonomy. I would argue that it needs to evolve to its logical third phase: geo-civilisational assertion through strategic realignment.

Most Indians have applauded India’s shift to a muscular, more self-assured stance on the global stage. Indeed, such a diplomatic trajectory, particularly since 2014, has widely, and sometimes proudly, been labelled as the “Modi Doctrine”.

But, and it would be only a truism to state this, the world has changed remarkably in the last 0 years. Has the time come to reset the Modi Doctrine? The answer, in my view, is a qualified yes.

The Modi Doctrine has served us well. Its successes are as remarkable as they are pal­pable. Their sum and substance, if we were to put it in one phrase, is the enhancement of India’s stature on the world stage.

This is neither the place nor the time to enumerate its drawbacks. But let us concede that some of its foundational pillars—Neighbourhood First, Act East, and, collaterally, garnering state awards or medals of honour for India’s prime minister, to name just three—seem to have lost some of their sheen. Not because they were flawed or not well thought out in the first place, but because they do not seem all that relevant or rewarding today.

Any which way you look at it, the elephant in the room, though, is “strategic autonomy”. One might even call it the spine of our foreign policy. But on closer and impartial examination, it is revealed as much more of an extension, rather than attenuation, of our once much-vaunted Nehruvian doctrine of “non-alignment”. Under Indira Gandhi, the mask of non-alignment was not so much com­pletely ripped off as India’s tilt towards the Soviet Union was no longer hidden or denied.

Indeed, were we to dig back even deeper, much of non-alignment, going back to the Bandung Conference of 1955 was little other than an extended international left front against Western imperialism.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, we were back to a somewhat looser multipolar arrangement in the interna­tional order. But not for too long. China soon occupied the space vacated and, with rapid strides, now challenges the hegemony of the US-led Western world. And now were already in the first leg of Cold War 2.0.

The core question is whether strategic autonomy, by clinging to a framework of rigid non-commitment—if not the fear of commit­ment—has become a fetter? Is it both a philosophical roadblock and policy straitjacket limiting India’s capacity for decisive action? Is the time ripe for a radical shift, a move away from the static, defensive posture of autonomy to a dynamic, proactive philosophy of strategic realignment, fundamentally rooted in India’s civilisational dharma?

To me, these are serious questions, which deserve profound consideration and debate. To be inclined, even allied, on the basis of atmashakti (self-assurance) and prabuddhasvartha(enlightened self-interest) might serve us better in the rapidly changing environment in today’s world. To solve the autonomy paradox and get over the Nehruvian intellectual hangover of non-alignment are, thus, opportune.

Cold War 2.0 exacerbates the urgency of such a makeover, imposing as it does, newer bipolar brutalities, not just strategic, but economic. In such a setting, strategic autonomy, regrettably, retains the foundational inhibitions of non-alignment, not to speak of an inherent, if not abiding discomfort, with formal commitments and alliances.

No, I am not advocating that India join one side or go over to the other side whole hog. That would only create new dependencies in the place of older ones. Indeed, such a tilt would go against our age-old advocacy and promise of Swarajya and Swatantrya. But even Kautilya harps on the need for strategic alliances—not non-alignment. Therefore, the reset that I am proposing actually champions the duty to choose, rather than remain aloof, from difficult challenges.

In a rapidly fragmenting, heteropolar world defined by interconnected supply chains, hyper-velocity technology transfers, and coordinated geopolitical pressures, the refusal to choose becomes a tactical vulnerability. It substitutes atmagaurav (self-respect) with a cautious, almost defensive, ekantavaad (isolationism).

Imagine the contrary scenario for a moment. Suppose we had a security treaty with the US in which it would assist us in case of an attack from China? Wouldn’t that be an effective deterrence, not only on our eastern but, by virtue of Pakistan’s dependence both on the US and China, on our western front as well?

What we would we have to offer in return could be negotiated. Given how costly terrorist strikes, or for that matter, the Manipur conflict more recently have proved to be, might we not actually benefit by putting, say, boots on the ground in exchange in our region of influence?

Indeed, what seems unimaginable right now must be thought through if we can effect such a shift to strategic realignment.

A couple of more examples: we already have an ongoing but never formalised defence understanding with Israel. Indeed, it is perhaps the only country that has helped us consistently in every regional conflict in recent times. What if we, to counter the Saudi-Pakistan defence treaty, formalise our alliance with Israel?

Finally, what if we turn our huge trade deficit with China, totalling close to $100 billion, into a treaty? Rather than live in denial, can we turn this unequal exchange into certain economic or even strategic guarantees?

Without quite joining the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), which in any case isn’t spoken of much these days, we might still be beneficiaries, especially in our currency and trade challenges.

That is why I would argue that India’s strategic interests are no longer served by standing awkwardly alone, but by assert­ively defining our place within the new global leela (drama). The avoidance of engagement is not Swatantrya. Instead, it is a form of miscalculated political paralysis.

The operational consequences of this intellectual inertia are visible across the strategic landscape. Some might even call this deep reluctance to integrate either strategically or economically with the US, European, or Western bloc—or with its arch-rival, the Sino-Russian axis—an impotence in the geo-economics of power.

I disagree. This would be a reductive oversimplification, not intermedial hermeneutics. India could, I would argue, can realign without being locked into either side. After all, Japan and Korea do lots of business with China, as do the Europeans and the Australians, while being formerly a part of the Western alliance.

Shying away from alliances has meant a diminished capac­ity for leverage. We wish to be global rule-makers but refuse to join the foundational groupings. This non-committal stance constrains access to critical high-end technology and limits our ability to reshape multilateral institutions from within. Our cau­tious economic posture, unlike the proactive integration of other emerging powers, has slowed our march towards true vikas.

Though a rising power, we still remain in the penumbra of the periphery. Even in our own immediate neighbourhood, our bandhus and sakhas (brother and friends) are few; hardly any one stands up for us in our hour of need, whether strategically or diplomatically. When India offers autonomy while China offers capital and commitment, the choice for the smaller states often becomes tragically clear.

OUR DOCTRINAL sentimentality has failed to translate India’s sheer size and cultural power into tangible regional leadership. Regime changes happen in our neighbourhood with India, ostensibly, being reduced to little more than a bystander.

Nowhere is our vulnerability more worrying than in the tech­nological upgradation of our armed forces. Here, make-in-India alone will not suffice. While bilateral military hardware procure­ment remains robust, the lack of binding security frameworks is a strategic handicap.

Against a two-front or, even, three-front challenge, the benefits of joint military cooperation, shared intelligence architecture, and truly interoperable systems—the “force multipliers” that define modern warfare—are forfeited in favour of a doctrinal self-sufficiency.

The cost of strategic autonomy is, quite literally, the potential for overwhelming tactical isolation when the moment of crisis arrives.

Finally, I would say that our current doctrine is reactive, focus­ing on managing great power competition rather than shaping the global narrative. A truly Bharatiya foreign policy must be an outward projection of its civilisational values, asserting itself globally on issues from data governance to climate dharma. Non-alignment prevents this assertion; it encourages diffidence when audacity is required to truly lead.

The path forward is not a sudden shift, but a mature, well-considered reset to strategic realignment. This is not a retreat into subser­vience, but a dynamic, flexible, and context-dependent assump­tion of paksha and pratibaddhata (alignment and commitment) when it strengthens Bharat Shakti. It is the recognition that, in the 21st century, genuine Swatantrya is achieved not by isolation, but by proactive engagement and judicious alignments.

After all, we cannot claim to embrace a new pragmatic policy, which is transactional, hardnosed, and realistic, while clinging on to our older moralistic and sentimental pieties. We will have to make a choice. And this is precisely what the world’s disruptor-in-chief, US President Donald J Trump, has forced upon us.

Looking around our neighbourhood we might turn, for a moment, to our western flank. Of course, we cannot go the way of this neighbour, a failed, some would go to the extent of saying rogue, mercenary state, by bending backwards and forwards in a show of grovelling and pathetic servility.

Civilisationally, Pakistan, one might argue, represents the defeated, rather than defiant, part of the Indian psyche. It lacks both the moral spine and the spiritual strength to stand up to superior power. India must never, indeed, it cannot take its cue from Pakistan. Maintaining our dignity, even under adversity, has been a Sanatani trait.

Indeed, the Bharatiya Rashtra represents that part of our civilisational psyche that has remained undefeated. As Swami Vivekananda put it, India “has withstood the shocks of centuries, of hundreds of foreign invasions, of hundreds of upheavals of manners and customs. It is the same land which stands firmer than any rock in the world, with its undying vigour, indestruc­tible life. Its life is of the same nature as the soul, without begin­ning and without end, immortal; and we are the children of such a country” (‘The Future of India’).

Speaking even in an idiom that Trump will understand, in addition to the atma-shakti of a deeply dharmic and ancient civilisation, we are the most populous nation in the world, besides being the fourth-largest economy in dollar terms. It is inconceivable that any global rearrangement can afford to bypass or ignore India.

That is why we must break free of the intellectual cage of non-alignment, a lingering vestige of a fearful post-colonial mindset. Autonomy without action remains merely an excuse; instead a thoroughly flexible, self-interested, and dynamic strategic realignment can help India fulfil its destiny as a vishvashakti. Indeed, that is the prerequisite of a vishvaguru.

For without shakti even a great guru does not command respect, let alone draw followers or devotees. As Sri Aurobindo famously put it, “We have abandoned Shakti and are therefore abandoned by Shakti” (Bhawani Mandir).

Strategic realignment, rather than professed autonomy or non-alignment, will give us the strength that we sorely lack.

Perhaps, the time has come for a reset of the Modi Doctrine. If strategic autonomy does not progress into strategic realignment, isn’t it little more than Nehruvian non-alignment by another name?