The Rise of Hyper Hindus

“HYPER HINDUS”? The phrase seems suddenly to have become popular, if not ubiquitous. For instance, Vinit Naik, better known as ‘Bhiku Mhatre’ ‘@MumbaichaDon’ on his X handle, posted on X on June 17: “Hyper Hindus won’t tell you this as there is nothing to demean & defame CM .@mieknathshinde Ji & Dy CM .@Dev_Fadnavis Ji, in this news. Maharashtra NDA Govt has shut down slaughterhouse near Shri Kshetra Siddhatek Ganapati temple (one of famous Ashtavinayak temples). Hindus incl. Dalits were protesting profusely against this slaughter house as per their faith & with Environmental Concerns.”

I won’t go into the contents of the post, but there was a quick rejoinder from another popular handle, Koi Sanjay Dixit@Sanjay_Dixit: “Who are the hyper Hindus, you cringe sycophant? They were the ones who stood by you.” The reference was to Naik’s arrest by the Karnataka police a month back for one of his posts, which has been subsequently deleted. This column is not quite a reply to the first part of Sanjay Dixit’s question, “Who are the hyper Hindus…?” But a reflection on the meaning of the phrase, which I myself used in my last column in this very space (‘End of Appeasement’, June 17, 2024).

I thought it might be worthwhile to explore its provenance too. I could trace one of the earliest reliable and respectable usages to a December 1, 1993 article in Hinduism Today. For those who don’t know it, Hinduism Today is one of the first international Hindu magazines, founded in 1979 by Sivaya Subramuniyaswami, who started an American monastic community in Kauai, Hawaii. The editorial team claims to produce the magazine for “the same reasons that other orders run ashrams, free eye-clinics or orphanages—as a selfless service to the world.”

The article in question, titled ‘1993: Year in Review’ is relevant, especially its opening sentence in which the phrase hyper Hindu is used: “It was a year of Orwellian drama—the simmering Ayodhya affair with promises by hyper-Hindus to reclaim more Hindu temples under Muslim mosques, keeping Hindu-Muslim relations on edge.” The Babri Masjid, we might recall, was brought down on December 6 of the previous year, 1992. The unnamed author of the subsequent year in review does not take kindly to the aggressive form of Hinduism that not only demolished the mosque but spearheaded the reclamation of Hindu holy sites destroyed or vandalised during Muslim rule in centuries bygone.

A lot has happened since then. Not only did the Ram Janmabhoomi Movement bring the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in Uttar Pradesh but also, most would agree, helped vote it to power in Delhi. In another 10 years, under the leadership of Narendra Modi, who became India’s 14th prime minister in 2014, BJP became India’s dominant political party. Its ideology, both stated and assumed, also pivoted from Gandhian socialism to Hindutva. Gandhi was ditched; Savarkar resurrected. Those that Hinduism Today referred to in 1993 as “hyper Hindus” became better known as proponents of Hindutva. What is more, a grand Ram Mandir was actually inaugurated in January 2024 on the very site of the demolished Babri Masjid.

If Hindutva has been so mainstreamed and acceptable, who, then, are the hyper Hindus? Let me offer a slightly roundabout way to address this question. As Modi begins his third term as India’s prime minister, a somewhat unusual question is being whispered: Have hyper Hindus spoiled Modi’s party? Such a question might seem counterintuitive but becomes pressing when the ruling BJP has been reduced to 240 seats, 63 less than the last time, in India’s 543-seat Lok Sabha.

But, once more, but who are these hyper Hindus? The source of the term, as I have shown, goes back at least three decades, but its current connotation is much more recent. It describes a breed of Indian ideologues and influencers— well-educated, fluent in English, economically and socially empowered, with a sizeable number even residing overseas. Unlike the traditional supporters of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), who were wont to be dismissed as “Hindutvavadi fascists”, hyper Hindus enjoy a privileged status and considerable professional and monetary clout. All of which makes them harder to ignore.

Hyper Hindus, thus, represent a distinct line of evolution, both ideologically and socially, from the traditional stereotype of Hindu nationalists. Have they augmented Modi’s Hindu-nationalist polemics and, unwittingly, caused a diminution of his appeal? Have they, in addition, constituted themselves into another pressure or special interest group that needs to be “appeased”? Used to be that the latter word almost exclusively referred to India’s sizeable Muslim minority, which numbers over 200 million. But now, in addition, do hyper Hindus, too, have to be politically propitiated?

Since Modi’s 2014 election, this group’s demands have intensified, shaping a socio-political climate that may have forced Modi’s hand in adopting policies that could have negatively impacted his appeal. Pressing the gas pedal on the more cautious traditional Hindu nationalist agenda, hyper Hindus have been far more impatient and insistent on radical change. What is more, they are marked by their overt and blunt, rather than indirect and subtle, critique of Islam itself. Not just of radical or jihadist Muslims.

Their fervour doesn’t stop at policy. Hyper Hindus push farther for the historical correction by reclaiming Hindu temples and releasing them from government controls. They resist privileges given to minorities, particularly Muslims, advocating staunchly against state-sponsored madrasas and the Waqf Act. Hyper Hindus, seeing Modi’s interventions as insufficient rectifications of historical grievances, press for a Hindu-centric narrative, overshadowing his development agenda. Critics argue this shift undermines minority rights, resulting in intolerance and a suppression of dissent.

The Modi government’s approach in the past to nationwide protests, the handling of issues related to Muslim minorities, and the framing of Hindu nationalist narratives have been flashpoints testing the resolve and rhetoric of the hyper Hindus. Their approach has sometimes overshadowed Modi’s developmental agenda, prompting concerns that the party’s inclusive development narrative might be eclipsed by the more strident Hindu-first discourse.

The rise of hyper Hindus has undoubtedly solidified BJP’s base but has simultaneously polarised Indian society and raised global concerns. This assertive group’s actions have led to both domestic and international criticism, pointing to a growing divide between sectarian interests and India’s pluralistic constitutional mandate. But RSS, as well as several sections of BJP, are uncomfortable with the rise of hyper Hindus. The latter are a double-edged weapon, which may cut the very hand that wields it.

Why? Because the hyper Hindus are not controlled by RSS and not entirely aligned to BJP’s agenda either. The ongoing debates over their presence and influence underline the tricky path that Modi and BJP must navigate. Modi must manage the fervent sabre-rattling of the hyper Hindus while addressing broader societal needs and trying to maintain harmony in India’s multi-religious social ethos, which RSS wants.

Moving forward, Modi’s challenge will be to leverage the energy of the hyper Hindus without further alienating other demographic segments. The government’s approach appears to focus on selective issue advancement to appease nationalist sentiments, while not losing sight of broader developmental and economic reforms. Because hyper Hindus will show continuing dissatisfaction with the pace of change, whether on the Uniform Civil Code, the abrogation of the Places of Worships Act, the Waqf Board Act, reclamation of more temples, and many other items on their charter of demands.

With the enormous self-assurance and their vaunted expertise, some might call it arrogance and claims to superior intelligence, some hyper Hindus have gone to the extent of dismissing the very Constitution of India as colonial and eminently scrap-worthy. Modi, on the other hand, began his third term by bowing low to the very Constitution that the Opposition said he would amend if he got a 400-plus super majority.

Hyper Hindus have become a potent force in rightwing Indian politics. Their brinkmanship may have enhanced BJP’s Hindu-nationalist agenda and its appeal in a small sub-elite but has also complicated the ruling party’s ability to govern a diverse society.

Defending Hinduismgovernment controlHindu nationalistsHindu templesHyper Hindusminorities