The Liberation of Goa

MY VISITS TO bookshops have fallen quite dramatically over the years, except when I am overseas. This doesn’t mean that my purchases of books have been similarly affected. Like many, I too have transferred my patronage to online sites which also offer fabulous discounts that book•shops cannot match.

It is from a casual perusal of a popular online site that I came across and subsequently purchased Valmiki Faleiro’s Goa, 1961: The Complete Story of Nationalism and Integration. More important, I finished the 391-page book in just two days. This isn’t because Faleiro is a compelling writer. He isn’t. But in
enthusiastically collating a huge amount of details and crafting a narrative, he has done a great public service and thrown open multiple possibilities to other writers and historians.

The history of post-Independence India is thoroughly under-explored for two reasons.

First, apart from certain landmark events such as the wars with Pakistan and China, the Kashmir, Khalistan, and Naxalite insurgencies, and, of course, Emergency, most other themes have sectional appeal. In happier circumstances—given that many Indian publications have dispensed with their book review pages—I would have expected the ever-mushrooming literature festivals to fill in the void. Unfortunately, many of these festivals appear to be curated by individuals whose principal relationship is with literary celebrities rather than books. The sessions are, moreover, designed to fit the template of studio discussions on TV channels.

I should also mention that many of the prominent publishers, some being Indian offshoots of international brands, seem to think that a release in Delhi with the beautiful people in attendance should suffice. Many good books are often sunk by indifferent publicity.

Second, the literature on post-1947 India has suffered grievously on account of the wayward archival policy of successive governments. By convention (if not rule), governments should despatch official documents to the archives after 30 years. If, for some reason, they remain hyper-sensitive, the time for non-disclosure should be extended to 50 years. But there should be a definite norm and archives, whether in Delhi or in the state capitals. Alas, in India, there is no fixed pattern. I am also told that the weeding out of the paperwork in government offices is also haphazard and arbitrary. Many important documents have been lost for posterity because some philistine officer had been entrusted with the task of selecting files for either retention (and subsequent transfer to the archives) or destruction.

The Army action in Goa (Operation Vijay) in 1961 and the police action in Hyderabad state (Operation Polo) in1948 have interested me ever since I began exploring the phenomenon of Razakars and pro-Pakistan sentiment in Bangladesh during and in the aftermath of the 1971 liberation movement. The Razakars as a phenomenon originated in Hyderabad in the last days of the Nizam, and their leader Kasim Razvi was responsible for many atrocities on Hindus. This in turn triggered retaliatory action by the Indian Army and Hindus against pro-Nizam Muslims after the police action. There are claims that some 40,000 Muslims were killed in retributive violence in 1948.

Alas, there are no good studies on the Razakars in Bangladesh and Hyderabad. The war crimes trial in Bangladesh generated a considerable amount of paperwork that can form the basis of some good histories.

Likewise, a scholar with a knowledge ofof both Urdu and Telugu, and familiarity with government sources should be researching Operation Polo. Maybe, they are. There are many unanswered questions that need attending.

This is also true about the liberation of Goa. Why did it take the Nehru government 14 years before proceeding against a recalcitrant Portugal that had made it clear it would not budge from Goa? What were the diplomatic complications involving the US and NATO? Did a big section of the so-called freedom fighters in Goa end up as smugglers with a vested interest in the perpetuation of the economic blockade? Was the Army action marked by considerable military inefficiency that was then overlooked but came back to haunt India during the conflict with China in 1962? Was the Indian Army guilty of rampant indiscipline, including looting, in the aftermath of the Portuguese surrender?

Was the intelligence supplied by the agencies to New Delhi completely flawed and based on fantasy?

These are some of the questions raised by Faleiro in a local history that doesn’t seek to gloss over uncomfortable facts. I wish the writer had also made arrangements to explore some of the records in the archives in Lisbon, not least the post-liberation dissection of the debacle.

In hindsight, Salazar didn’t do badly holding out against Nehru for 14 years. Even when Goa finally fell, it was Nehru who received all the flak.

About The Author

Swapan Dasgupta

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