Russia in the Room

THOUGH NO conclusive resolution was reached in the historic summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Alaska, the looming concern of additional tariffs being imposed on India has now been minimised. For New Delhi, the last weeks of tariff brinkmanship were nothing short of a geopolitical stress test. Trump’s return initially suggested a softer US line towards Russia, raising the prospects of India’s engagement with Russia being insulated from sanctions. However, as Russia’s offensive in Ukraine dragged on, European states scaled up military aid to Kyiv, and public sentiment in the US hardened against Moscow. Trump quickly grew impatient, leading him to tighten secondary tariffs against countries purchasing oil from Russia. Singling India out, Trump imposed 25 per cent tariffs on India and an additional 25 per cent secondary tariffs, with the underlying strategy of nudging New Delhi to reconsider its longstanding relations with Moscow. India’s political leadership defended its national security interests while ensuring that the situation did not get out of hand. Nevertheless, with the immediate storm clouds receding, Trump’s willingness to undermine India’s energy security and strategic autonomy has raised new questions about the trajectory of US-India relations.

India’s relations with Russia have remained a point of friction in New Delhi’s engagement with the West, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. India’s stance on the war, not directly condemning Moscow and subsequently increasing the import of discounted crude from Russia, has attracted criticism from the West, with accusations of India indirectly fuelling Russia’s war economy. Paradoxically, several Western officials—including in Washington— have admitted that India’s oil imports from Russia had a stabilising effect on the global energy markets and curbed inflationary pressures. Between January 2023 and mid- 2025, Delhi imported Russian crude worth $120 billion, generating positive multiplier effects for the Indian economy. At the same time, a few smallscale Indian firms were sanctioned by the US treasury, but the impacts of these sanctions were negligible. Even with the sanctions, there was a degree of cognisance of India’s historical relations with Russia, forged during the Cold War, driven by shared interests, and fostered by decades of strong economic ties and a robust military-technical partnership. As Russia’s contestation with the West intensified, ties with India deepened. Meanwhile, even as India’s defence imports decline from Russia, marked by the country’s efforts to indigenise defence production and diversify military acquisition away from Russia, more than half of India’s defence equipment remains of Russian origin. For Washington, Russia’s continued relevance in New Delhi’s strategic calculus remains an irritant.

In the last days of the Biden administration, the US treasury imposed sanctions on several Russian oil and gas companies which included restrictions on Russian maritime insurance companies, and on 180 oil container ships involved in the transshipment of Russian oil below the price cap. These restrictions risked triggering secondary sanctions (sanctions imposed on third entities) on Indian oil firms. However, with Trump in office, the discourse around US support to Ukraine shifted, with talks of American businesses returning to Russia, and the prospects of sanctions easing gaining traction. But with Trump’s frustration growing against Putin, the US Congress began deliberating on imposing steep tariffs as high as 500 per cent on countries importing Russian oil. Against this backdrop, dissatisfaction has persisted with New Delhi over the deadlock in trade negotiations and India’s reluctance to purchase F-35 fighter jets. Trump imposed 50 per cent tariffs on India, with the supplementary 25 per cent tariffs being active from August 27. In response, New Delhi denounced the measures as unfair and unjustified, reiterating that it would take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests. Meanwhile, discounts on Russian crude, which were as high as $15-$20 a barrel in 2023, had narrowed to as low as $2-$3 per barrel this year, prompting Indian importers to look for new markets to offset their energy needs. Despite these shifts, Delhi pushed back against these tariffs. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval’s visit to Moscow and the subsequent telephone conversation between Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi further highlighted Russia’s importance in India’s strategic calculus.

Even in the final hours before the Alaska summit, the threats of imposing additional tariffs persisted. Yet, there was a wide-reaching consensus among experts that such tariffs would not be imposed, given the risks of soaring commodity prices and fears of a global recession. The outcome was therefore predictable, much like earlier summits in the history of Russian- American relations. Since the peak of the Cold War such visits have carried strategic significance, often serving as indicators of the broader direction of bilateral ties. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s meeting with US President Franklin D Roosevelt in Yalta in 1945, Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Washington in the autumn of 1959, US President Richard Nixon’s visit to Moscow in 1972, and Mikhail Gorbachev’s meeting with Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik have had significant outcomes. For Putin, being welcomed with full honours at a venue rich in historical symbolism was a diplomatic gain, giving him recognition from Washington. While the summit did not result in any agreement on ending the war, the meeting has, in a sense, set the general direction for further negotiations, which includes pragmatic deliberations on security guarantees, and the modalities of freezing the conflict. Some of these issues were discussed in Trump’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington, days after the summit, underscoring that Anchorage was less a conclusion than a starting point for diplomacy. Though there are no iron-clad statements confirming the removal of additional tariffs on India, the shift in Trump’s tone indicates the likelihood that the moratorium on the introduction of the secondary tariffs could be extended. These developments are welcome for Delhi, giving India the strategic vacuum to manoeuvre and conclude the trade deal.

Nevertheless, even with securing a political victory in resisting the threat of sanctions, the recent episode has highlighted three structural realities that India must contend with. First, the need to recalibrate its economy in response to the evolving dynamics of globalisation; second, its relations with Russia, though a strategic necessity, now expose India more acutely to external economic pressures; and third, the fact that Trump’s unpredictable, transactional approach highlights the risk of leaning too heavily on Washington’s goodwill.

Delhi-MoscowDonald TrumpF-35 fighter jetsIndia-Russia relationsPutinRussian oiltrade tariff