Déjà Vu in Pakistan

AS 128.58 MILLION registered voters got ready to go to polls on February 8, many inside Pakistan and abroad were wondering if this would be a fraught exercise yet again. Would the election be fixed, as it appears to have been done in the past? And what will be the end result for the people of Pakistan?

The last time Pakistan went to polls in 2018, the military’s reported favourite was Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). His principal rival, former Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group (PML-N), was disqualified. Khan won the most seats in the National Assembly and went on to form the government with a coalition of smaller parties at the centre as well as in the major Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. While no rigging was substantiated on election day in 2018, there were reports of intelligence officials offering candidates in key constituencies, especially in Punjab, choices of either running on PTI tickets, as independents, or not running at all. Many chose the first option. Others hedged their bets as independents and later joined the PTI government.

This time round, it is Khan who is disqualified, having been convicted and sentenced in several cases while facing scores of others. His party has been ripped apart after the public unrest and attacks on military installations of May 9, 2023; party leaders and social media influencers were taken into custody and later emerged to either publicly break with him or to retire from politics. Street unrest followed the arrest of Khan by the paramilitary rangers.

Such a wild and manipulated swing of the election pendulum from one party to the other in Pakistan portends uncertainty and political conflict for the foreseeable future. All this, against the background of a dire economic situation. Pakistan has not been able to emerge out of the depths of Covid-19 followed by devastating floods. Nor has it recovered from the profligate spending during the latter part of Khan’s own term, as he prepared for the next elections. Or from the mismanagement of the exchange rate by the coalition government that succeeded him after his removal through a vote of no-confidence.

Pakistan’s annual growth rate is around 2 per cent compared with the 6 to 7 per cent needed for it to stay ahead of its rapidly rising population. Inflation is around 40 per cent, with food inflation near 50 per cent, and the poorest segments suffer the most since they spend half their income on food. The size of the middle class, the expected engine of Pakistan’s growth, has also fallen from around 50 million to around 22 million. The country also desperately needs the remaining $1.2 billion of its current International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme that expires in April. The new government will have to rapidly move to curb spending and increase tax revenues to qualify for a fresh programme that will help bring ancillary funding from multilateral and private sources.

Power shortages have hurt the economy by constraining exports, despite the deep devaluation of the Pakistani rupee that could have fuelled an export surge by making Pakistani products cheaper for foreign buyers. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been slowing down. Remittances from overseas Pakistanis have dropped from a height of $31 billion a year to close to $22 billion. And Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves are hovering around the $8 billion mark, while it will need to make repayments in the period of January to June 2024 of about $9 billion, with another $4-5 billion in the period of July to December. It will need to rely on the continuing pity and largesse of friends like China and countries in the Arabian Peninsula to roll over previous debts or deposits with the State Bank of Pakistan to keep its head above water.

So, winning this election may be a mixed blessing for whichever party manages to garner the most votes at the centre and in the major provinces of Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Early prognostications pointed the way for a PML-N win with the possibility of Nawaz Sharif becoming prime minister for the fourth time, heading a coalition yet again. The Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) was widely expected yet again to retain its control over Sindh. It had damaged its base in Punjab over the past decades. Balochistan will likely remain seriously divided among its traditional smaller parties who will then align themselves with the winner at the centre. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa might see a coalition yet again of the religious parties, either with PML-N or the independents of PTI.

Winning this election may be a mixed blessing. Early prognostications pointed the way for a PML-N win with the possibility of Nawaz Sharif becoming prime minister for the fourth time, heading a coalition yet again

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But several factors may yet upset the pundits’ predictions. A major determinant will be the turnout. A larger turnout might help the shadow PTI candidates, including those still in prison. The average turnout in six of the previous 11 general elections has been around 45 per cent, much lower than the turnout in neighbouring India, Iran, and distant Bangladesh. As cited by columnist Maleeha Lodhi, independents form over 60 per cent of the candidates for the 266 general seats in the National Assembly and double the number of party candidates in the provincial assembly elections this year. How many of these independents will remain faithful PTI followers may be a powerful element in the results of this election.

Young voters are also a powerful new bloc, rising from 46 per cent in 2018 to some 57 per cent in 2024. PTI has been counting on its social media campaign to galvanise most of the youth vote. If they come out to vote on February 8, they could become a deciding factor. Youth often sleep in on election day in Pakistan with some 25 per cent coming out to vote, according to one Gallup Pakistan poll. No different than their counterparts in the developed world! To make a difference this time, they must wake up and walk their talk by voting.

Finally, security will play a role in determining who wins in the huge number of so-called sensitive constituencies subject to security threats. Early reports of terrorist attacks in Balochistan might scare people in other parts of the country. That may affect turnout. And given Pakistan’s first-past-the-post system of winner-takes-all, small differences in totals might swing seats one way or the other in these marginal seats, thus confounding the pundits and those who may have tried to manage the elections one way or the other.

The Pakistani population is largely young and unpredictable. Its political parties are largely dynastic and doddering in comparison. They have created a culture of entitlement and privilege for their benefit. The voter occasionally surprises them. This happened in 1970, in both West and East Pakistan. Pakistani leaders need to remember their history to avoid the mistakes and miscalculations of the past. Economic challenges loom large. Political instability caused by short-term political games following these elections will threaten recovery and growth for the longer term. It will harm Pakistan not only domestically but also in its ability to create a better neighbourhood for improved trade development, and peace.

About The Author

Shuja Nawaz

Shuja Nawaz is the founding director and Distinguished Fellow at the South Asia Centre of the Atlantic Council in Washington DC and the author of The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood and Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within

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