Back to Kabul

ON JANUARY 8, Vikram Misri, the foreign secretary of India, held a meeting with the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s (IEA) Acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, in Dubai. Marking the most high-level meeting between India and representatives from the IEA, the very act of the senior-most Indian diplomat meeting a Taliban leader and its timing in the aftermath of Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan and India’s strongly worded statement in support of the latter led to debates about an apparent “pivot” and “shift” in how India is engaging with Afghanistan. Three-and-a-half years after the Taliban usurped power in Kabul and orchestrated the fall of the then republic government, New Delhi’s approach towards the country has indeed been evolving.

As per the press statement released by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the agenda of the meeting included a discussion on the overall bilateral relationship and the developments in the region. Reiterating the strong foundational ties between the people of India and Afghanistan, India agreed to extend both “humanitarian and developmental support” to the country. It is committed to engaging in development projects in the near future. It also promised material support in the health sector, the rehabilitation of refugees, and overall cooperation in cricket. India also underscored the importance of the Chabahar port for both trade/commercial purposes and for facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. New Delhi also expressed satisfaction over the sensitivity shown by the Afghan side towards its security concerns, and both sides agreed to continue their contact at various levels.

Since the Taliban’s return to Kabul in August 2021, New Delhi’s policy can best be described as ad hoc and incremental, shaped by how the situation unfolded in the country. As fighting intensified, New Delhi downed the shutters on its consulates in Herat and Kandahar first and subsequently evacuated its embassy in Kabul, revoking the pre-existing visas of several Afghan citizens. In the initial months of the fall of Kabul, it urged the Taliban to form an inclusive government and respect India’s security and other related concerns.

The first official meeting between the two sides was in August 2021 when India’s then-ambassador to Qatar met the then-head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai. While New Delhi did continue to urge the Taliban to practice inclusivity and protect the rights of women, news about New Delhi allowing Taliban members to attend a training course offered by MEA underlined the changing trajectory of India’s policy.

In November 2023, Afghanistan’s embassy in the country also got embroiled in a controversy, with the Republic-era diplomats leaving the embassy, stating their inability to carry out their functions effectively due to a lack of support from India and increasing pressure from the Taliban to place their diplomats in control. The consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad also subsequently got under Taliban control. The number of engagements between the two sides has also increased in the last three-and-a-half years. India also participated in the Afghanistan Regional Cooperation Initiative in January 2024, and representatives from the Taliban have participated in meetings of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India.

A few days before the meeting in Dubai, the Indian foreign secretary also met Iran’s deputy foreign minister for political affairs. Both countries stressed the importance of the Chabahar port for Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development.

These developments follow the agreement signed between Iran and India in May 2024 to develop and operate the port. This reflects a growing urgency on all sides to leverage the port to reduce Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistan’s Karachi and Gwadar port and enhance trade linkages with the country. India’s decision to expand its assistance from humanitarian to developmental aspects also reflects a growing willingness from New Delhi to come out in support of the Afghan people.

When attempting to understand the motivations behind India’s outreach to the Taliban-led IEA, two perspectives come to the fore. On one hand, since the US withdrawal from the country in 2021, New Delhi has been cognisant of the threat of terrorism from Afghanistan. Concerns about the Taliban’s overt or covert support to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, and particularly groups inimical to India like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), have bothered New Delhi. The reports of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team stating the presence of these groups and the growing threat of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) have further bolstered these fears. Thus, India’s biggest concern has been to prevent the (re)emergence of Afghanistan as a threat. Its efforts to, therefore, engage with the group stem from this security compulsion.

On the other hand, the status quo in the region warrants India’s outreach to the regime in Kabul to have some semblance of influence over the situation inside the country. New Delhi is thus proactively trying to secure its bets in a changed Afghanistan. Since the Taliban’s return, other countries in the region, like Russia, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and now even Tajikistan, have been taking positive steps forward to normalise ties with the Taliban. The Afghan embassies in all these countries are under the control of the Taliban. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have removed the Taliban from their list of terrorist organisations. At the same time, the Russian parliament recently passed a law which would consequently allow the country to remove groups like the Taliban from the list of terror groups. China, on the other hand, has been the most proactive in normalising its relationship—appointing new ambassadors on both sides, signing minerals and other mining contracts, having regular engagements with members of IEA and having discussions on expanding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to the country. While all these countries have security concerns, their proactive engagement has prompted New Delhi to step up its act. The fast-deteriorating relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan has also given New Delhi enough space to secure its interests.

In the last week of 2024, Pakistan unleashed air strikes against Afghanistan, purportedly targeting members of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has been on an unceasing onslaught against Pakistan since the Taliban’s return. As per Afghanistan, the strikes affected civilians, killing 51 people in the Paktika province. India released a statement on January 6, condemning Pakistan and accusing it of blaming its neighbours for its problems. The statement of support to Afghanistan vis-à-vis the skirmish, followed by the meeting in Dubai, was taken together to explain that the Indian outreach is led by the prospect of isolating Pakistan in the region.

In the official statement from IEA’s foreign affairs ministry, the Taliban talked of India as a “key economic and regional player” and expressed their willingness to strengthen political and economic relations with the country. As per them, Afghanistan does not pose a threat to any nation. They urged India to liberalise the visa regime and stated that their handling of the country—particularly controlling the drugs trade and bringing down corruption— was commended by the Indian side. While this does not find any mention in the Indian press statement, it does indicate IEA’s growing intention to engage more actively with India.

Even as India, along with other regional countries accepts the reality of working with the Taliban, the situation of the Afghan people remains dire. A regime which is increasingly insulated from international pressure on its domestic policies can adversely impact the interests of other countries in the long run. While India now has more space to secure its interests, New Delhi will have to find ways to reconcile its outreach to the Taliban with the concerns of the Afghan people who have been affected the most after the group’s return.

diplomacyforeign policyIndia-Afghanistan relationsMawlawi Amir Khan MuttaqiPakistanTalibanVikram Misri