A Strategic Shift: Defence modernisation brings India and Germany closer

INDIA’S DEFENCE ENGAGEMENT with Germany is entering a qualitatively new phase, one that reflects not only a convergence of interests but also a shared recognition of the changing character of global power politics. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s recent visit to Berlin underscores this transition—from cautious engagement to a more purposeful and structured partnership.

What was once a peripheral defence relationship is now being recast as a critical component of both countries' strategic outlooks as they evolve. The agreements signed during the visit—a Defence Industrial Cooperation Roadmap and an implementing arrangement on UN peacekeeping training—signal an intent to institutionalise defence ties over the long term.

These are not merely symbolic documents; they provide a framework for both sides to pursue co-development and co-production systematically. For India, which has long sought to reduce its dependence on external suppliers while enhancing domestic capabilities, such frameworks are indispensable. For Germany, they represent an opportunity to reposition its defence industry in a more competitive and geopolitically relevant manner.

Yet, the most telling aspect of the visit was not the paperwork but the optics and substance of Singh’s engagement with Germany’s naval industrial base. His visit to the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems shipyard in Kiel, accompanied by Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, and his boarding of a Type 212 submarine, highlight the centrality of maritime cooperation in this emerging partnership. In contemporary strategic discourse, the undersea domain has acquired renewed salience. Submarines are not just platforms of war; they are instruments of deterrence, intelligence gathering, and sea denial. For a country like India, with expanding maritime interests in the Indian Ocean and beyond, strengthening undersea capabilities is imperative.

It is in this context that Project 75(I) assumes critical importance. This ambitious programme, aimed at acquiring six advanced diesel-electric submarines equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion systems, represents one of the largest defence procurements currently under consideration. Valued at approximately US$8-10 billion, it is as much about capability acquisition as it is about industrial transformation. The selection of Germany’s TKMS in partnership with Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders reflects a calculated choice: to combine proven technological expertise with domestic manufacturing capacity.

The proposed submarines, based on the Type 214 NG design, offer a range of advanced features that would significantly enhance the Indian Navy’s operational profile. Air-Independent Propulsion allows submarines to remain submerged for extended periods, thereby dramatically improving stealth and survivability. Coupled with quiet propulsion systems, advanced sensors, and modern combat suites, these platforms would provide India with a credible edge in underwater warfare. In a region where naval competition is intensifying, particularly with China’s growing maritime footprint, such capabilities are indispensable.

However, what distinguishes this project from earlier acquisitions is the emphasis on the transfer of technology and local manufacturing. India is no longer content with being a mere buyer of defence equipment; it seeks to become a producer, and eventually an innovator. The partnership with TKMS is expected to involve substantial technology transfer, enabling the Indian industry to absorb and adapt advanced submarine-building expertise. Ancillary agreements, including those related to torpedo production, further deepen this industrial ecosystem. In effect, Project 75(I) is designed to create not just submarines, but a sustainable domestic capability in complex naval systems.

Germany’s willingness to engage at this level is itself a reflection of its evolving strategic posture. The watershed moment came in 2022, when then Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a “Zeitenwende”—a turning point in Germany’s defence and security policy. Triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this shift marked the end of decades of relative military restraint. Since then, Berlin has embarked on a path of significant defence modernisation, backed by increased financial commitments and institutional reforms. Under its current leadership, Germany is seeking to transform the Bundeswehr into a force capable of responding to high-intensity conflicts. Defence spending is set to rise substantially, with long-term targets that align more closely with NATO expectations. The unveiling of a comprehensive national military strategy further signals a departure from the past. By articulating clear objectives—ranging from immediate readiness to long-term technological superiority—Germany is attempting to redefine its role within Europe and beyond.

Equally noteworthy is Germany’s gradual reorientation towards the Indo-Pacific. Traditionally, Berlin’s strategic focus was overwhelmingly centred on Europe, particularly in relation to Russia. However, there is now a growing recognition that security challenges are interconnected. Developments in the region, especially China’s assertiveness, have direct implications for European stability and economic interests. As a result, Germany has begun to expand its engagement in the Indo-Pacific through naval deployments, defence dialogues, and industry partnerships.

In this evolving framework, India occupies a pivotal position. As a major maritime power with a commitment to a rules-based order, India offers Germany both strategic alignment and operational opportunity. The growing defence cooperation between the two countries is thus not an isolated development; it is part of a broader recalibration of Germany’s global role. For Berlin, partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are no longer optional; they are integral to its long-term strategic calculus.

For India, this engagement provides a valuable opportunity to diversify its defence partnerships. Historically reliant on a narrow set of suppliers, India has increasingly sought to broaden its options. Collaboration with Germany complements existing ties with countries such as the US, France, and Russia, while also introducing new technological avenues. More importantly, it reinforces India’s strategy of multialignment— engaging with multiple partners without being constrained by rigid alliances.

The path ahead is not without challenges. The successful implementation of Project 75(I) will depend on a range of factors, including timely approvals, effective coordination between stakeholders, and the smooth execution of technology transfer arrangements. Differences in regulatory frameworks, export controls, and strategic priorities could also pose hurdles. Moreover, the broader geopolitical environment remains fluid, with uncertainties that could impact both countries’ policy choices. Nevertheless, the trajectory of India-Germany defence ties appears firmly upward. The recent visit of Rajnath Singh has injected new momentum into the relationship, providing both political direction and operational clarity. If sustained, this engagement could evolve into a omprehensive defence-industrial partnership, with implications that extend beyond bilateral ties. Ultimately, what is unfolding is a convergence driven by necessity as much as by opportunity. Germany’s search for a more assertive global role and India’s quest for strategic autonomy are intersecting in meaningful ways. The focus on submarine cooperation is particularly significant, as it addresses one of the most critical domains of modern warfare. In doing so, it not only enhances India’s defence capabilities but also anchors Germany more firmly in the Indo-Pacific security architecture.

In an era marked by uncertainty and competition, such partnerships are likely to become increasingly important. The India-Germany defence relationship, once tentative and limited, is now poised to become a substantive pillar of both countries’ strategic engagements. Whether it realises its full potential will depend on the ability of both sides to translate intent into action—but the direction, for now, is unmistakably clear.