Decathlon Has Outrun Nike, Adidas and Puma in India. Can It Win Serious Athletes?

Decathlon taught Indians that buying a badminton racquet did not require knowing a badminton brand.

It placed bicycles, tents, football boots, yoga mats, swimming goggles, trekking jackets and table-tennis tables inside the same enormous blue box. A customer could enter with a vague intention to become active and leave equipped for a sport they had never played.

That proposition has produced a business few logo-led rivals have matched in India. Decathlon Sports India’s revenue from operations rose 8.35 per cent to ₹4,478 crore in FY26. Total income reached ₹4,517 crore, EBITDA stood at ₹424 crore and net profit recovered to ₹63 crore after a ₹65-crore loss in FY25.

The top line places Decathlon ahead of the latest reported India revenues of Puma, Adidas, Skechers and Nike as individual businesses. The comparison needs qualification because the companies have different financial years, corporate structures and routes to market. Decathlon also sells bulky equipment and accessories across dozens of sports, while its rivals derive much more of their business from footwear and apparel.

The broad direction is still striking. A French retailer with no global celebrity sneaker franchise has built more India revenue than companies whose logos enjoy far greater cultural recognition.

Its advantage has been the absence of a brand premium. Its next problem may be the absence of one.

INDIA’S BIGGEST SPORTS SHOP DID NOT SELL SPORTING GLAMOUR

Nike, Adidas and Puma traditionally begin with the athlete, the shoe and the logo. Decathlon begins with the activity.

Its stores ask whether a customer wants to hike, swim, cycle, camp, run or play a team sport. The company then supplies most of what that activity requires through labels it controls, including Quechua, Domyos, Kipsta, Rockrider, Artengo and Kalenji. This turns Decathlon into designer, brand owner, sourcer, distributor and retailer.

Owning the chain removes several costs embedded in a conventional sportswear product. Decathlon does not have to pay an outside brand’s wholesale margin before adding its own retail margin. It can put money into product design and manufacturing while spending less on celebrity endorsements and fashion-led campaigns. Products can be positioned at tightly separated prices, allowing a beginner to enter cheaply and upgrade later.

The model is especially suited to India. Sporting participation remains fragmented, household budgets are sensitive and many customers are buying their first serious product in a category. A parent may hesitate before spending heavily on a sport a child could abandon within months. A first-time trekker does not necessarily want Himalayan-grade equipment. Decathlon lowers the cost of trying.

That is more than a pricing strategy. It is a demand-creation system.

DECATHLON IS AHEAD, BUT THE SCOREBOARD NEEDS CONTEXT

Decathlon’s ₹4,478-crore FY26 operating revenue compares with approximately ₹3,200 crore reported for Puma India in 2026. Adidas India Marketing recorded total revenue of about ₹3,259 crore in FY25, while Skechers South Asia reported ₹1,971 crore. Nike India’s FY25 total revenue was approximately ₹1,381 crore.

These figures do not create a perfectly comparable league table. Puma and Adidas have extensive franchise and wholesale networks, and the revenue captured by an Indian subsidiary may not represent every rupee consumers spend on the brand. Nike’s local distribution and digital arrangements have also changed. Decathlon books sales across apparel, shoes, equipment and accessories through its own large retail system.

Revenue leadership does not equal category leadership either. Puma and Adidas retain greater visibility in fashion and sneaker culture. Skechers has stronger premium walking credentials. Nike remains the global benchmark for sporting aspiration despite its smaller reported Indian entity.

Euromonitor’s 2025 sportswear assessment placed Puma first in India with a 6 per cent share, followed by Adidas at 5 per cent and Skechers at 4 per cent. The apparent contradiction is explained partly by category definition: sportswear measurements concentrate on apparel and footwear, while Decathlon’s revenue basket includes equipment and outdoor gear.

Decathlon can, therefore, be India’s largest broad-based sporting-goods retailer without being its largest sportswear label.

That distinction sits at the heart of its next phase.

THE ₹4,000-CRORE PLATEAU IS REAL

Decathlon’s long-term growth remains impressive. Operating revenue rose from ₹2,208 crore in FY20 to ₹4,478 crore in FY26, equivalent to a compound annual growth rate of roughly 12.5 per cent.

The recent picture is slower. Revenue climbed from ₹3,920 crore in FY23 to ₹4,008 crore in FY24, ₹4,133 crore in FY25 and ₹4,478 crore in FY26. That represents annualised growth of only about 4.5 per cent over three years.

FY26 has improved the trajectory, but Decathlon has spent three years near the ₹4,000-crore band. The post-pandemic jump has ended, and expansion must now come from more deliberate sources: new cities, higher spending per customer, online availability, institutional sales and products aimed at committed athletes.

The company has raised its FY30 revenue ambition from ₹8,000 crore to ₹10,000 crore. Reaching that figure from FY26 would require annual growth of approximately 22 per cent for four consecutive years.

Its store target alone cannot deliver that. Decathlon plans to expand from 132 stores to about 200 by 2030, an increase of roughly 52 per cent. Even if every new outlet eventually matched the existing network’s average productivity, the resulting expansion would not automatically double revenue.

New stores also take time to mature and are increasingly likely to open in smaller markets. Decathlon must therefore improve revenue through existing stores and channels while building the next 68 locations.

The ₹10,000-crore target is an ambition to alter the growth curve, not a continuation of the present one.

THE PROFIT RECOVERY IS ENCOURAGING, NOT YET COMFORTABLE

FY26 reversed the previous year’s loss, but ₹63 crore of net profit on ₹4,517 crore of total income produces a margin of only about 1.4 per cent.

The previous three years have been volatile. Decathlon lost ₹18.6 crore in FY23, earned ₹197.2 crore in FY24, lost ₹65 crore in FY25 and returned to profit in FY26. In FY25, revenue grew only 3.1 per cent while material costs, employee expenditure, store overheads and depreciation increased much faster. Depreciation rose 74 per cent to ₹305 crore as investment in stores and manufacturing moved through the accounts.

FY26 shows better operating leverage. Procurement expenses rose 7.4 per cent, below revenue growth, and total expenditure increased by about 4 per cent. Employee costs, however, rose 12 per cent to ₹407 crore.

The ₹424-crore EBITDA indicates that the operating engine is producing cash earnings before depreciation, interest and tax. The distance between EBITDA and ₹63 crore of profit also matters. Decathlon’s large-store and manufacturing model carries substantial occupancy, depreciation and investment costs after the headline operating measure.

Published databases calculate EBITDA differently, particularly in businesses affected by lease accounting. The safest conclusion comes from revenue, expenses and profit: Decathlon India is back in the black, but has not yet demonstrated stable, high-margin profitability.

Globally, Decathlon produced €16.8 billion of net sales, €1.8 billion of EBITDA and €910 million of net income in 2025. Its global net margin was approximately 5.4 per cent, nearly four times the Indian arm’s FY26 margin.

India is growing faster than the group, but it is not yet converting sales into comparable bottom-line efficiency.

KIPRUN IS A TEST OF WHETHER VALUE CAN BECOME ASPIRATIONAL

Decathlon’s most revealing India move is not another cavernous store. It is KIPRUN.

The specialist running label has been expanded in India with 35 products, including 17 performance shoes. Decathlon wants its running business, currently just below ₹500 crore, to cross ₹1,000 crore by 2030 and reach five million runners.

Running is an intelligent category in which to test premiumisation. India held approximately 2,000 running events in 2025, compared with 500 to 600 in 2018, according to Decathlon India CEO Sankar Chatterjee. Running attracts repeat spending, community participation and measurable product progression. A beginner moves from basic shoes to technical footwear, watches, hydration packs, race apparel and trail equipment.

It is also intensely competitive. Puma says running accounts for nearly 30 per cent of sales in its retail stores. Asics is pursuing premium runners, while New Balance, Hoka and On are attracting consumers willing to spend ₹10,000 to ₹20,000 on footwear. Nike and Adidas bring deep performance histories and cultural capital.

Decathlon can undercut them. KIPRUN must prove it can also be desired beside them.

This is not a cosmetic problem. Serious athletes use brands as shorthand for trust. A marathon shoe must survive hundreds of kilometres; a climbing product or bicycle component carries a safety dimension. Technical credibility is built through testing, elite validation, specialist retail staff and communities, not only through price.

Decathlon’s global brand overhaul acknowledges the challenge. It has reduced a confusing portfolio of nearly 80 labels to a clearer system under the Decathlon name, supported by nine category specialists and four expert brands: KIPRUN, Van Rysel, Simond and Solognac. The company is trying to retain beginner accessibility while persuading advanced consumers that it can make elite products.

India will reveal whether those two promises can occupy the same shelf.

MADE IN INDIA IS MORE THAN A COST STORY

Decathlon is investing €100 million in India across stores and manufacturing. Half the products sold in its Indian stores by volume are now made locally, according to the company. It wants India’s share of global sourcing to rise from about 8 per cent to 15 per cent by 2030, with annual sourcing approaching $3 billion.

Its ambition extends beyond textiles. Almost all the bicycles it sells in India are locally manufactured, while roughly half its footwear is made here. The company is adding capability in plastics, composites, metals, electronics and fitness equipment.

Localisation can shorten lead times, lower exposure to currency movements and allow products to be designed around Indian prices and conditions. Export scale can make factories viable even when domestic demand in a specialised category remains small.

It can also turn India from a sales market into a strategic production base for Europe and other regions. The proposed India–European Union trade agreement could improve that equation, depending on its final rules for tariffs and origin.

Yet manufacturing expansion helps only if Decathlon continues selling enough product at healthy margins. An integrated supply chain creates control, but it also creates fixed commitments. The same model that removes middlemen makes Decathlon responsible for forecasting demand, carrying inventory and keeping its own labels relevant.

ITS NEXT STORE MAY NOT LOOK LIKE ITS FIRST

The original Decathlon formula depended on destination stores with large floors, abundant parking and spaces where customers could touch, test and sometimes play with products.

That model built trust but restricted geographic reach. India’s next consumers are spread across tier-two and tier-three cities where appropriate real estate may be smaller and demand across individual sports less predictable.

Decathlon is responding through several routes. Digital sales account for an estimated 15 to 20 per cent of its India business. Quick commerce is being used for urgent, compact purchases such as shuttlecocks, swimming accessories and cricket balls. Its wholesale operation has grown twentyfold in five years and now contributes about 10 per cent of revenue, supplying schools, companies, defence organisations, government bodies and sporting communities across more than 20,000 pin codes.

B2B is strategically important because it reaches places where a full store cannot yet be justified. A school buying equipment can introduce hundreds of children to Decathlon products. Defence canteens and government procurement expand distribution without requiring premium retail property.

The risk is channel sprawl. Stores, marketplaces, quick commerce, wholesale and institutional contracts have different assortments, economics and service expectations. Decathlon’s integrated model works best when volume simplifies the chain. Too many fragmented channels can introduce the complexity it was built to avoid.

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS IS HEALTHY, BUT ALSO CHANGING IDENTITY

Decathlon remains much smaller globally than Nike and Adidas, but it is no niche retailer. Its 2025 gross merchandise value reached €20.7 billion, net sales rose 4 per cent to €16.8 billion, EBITDA increased 21 per cent to €1.8 billion and net profit climbed 16 per cent to €910 million. It operated 1,902 stores across 82 markets and sold 1.23 billion products.

Nike generated approximately $46.3 billion in FY26 revenue, while Adidas recorded €24.8 billion in 2025. Decathlon nevertheless sits comfortably above Puma and New Balance by global sales.

Its international challenge resembles its Indian one. Decathlon has mastered accessible participation, while specialist and lifestyle brands command greater aspiration. The company’s 2024 rebrand, expert labels, athlete partnerships, redesigned stores and stronger storytelling represent an attempt to move beyond functional retail.

This transition must be handled carefully. Premium products can lift average selling prices and margins, but a more fashionable Decathlon could alienate customers who trust it precisely because it does not behave like a fashion house. Marketing costs can rise before perception changes. Simplifying dozens of labels can strengthen the parent name while weakening the small specialist identities consumers already recognise.

The 2025 results suggest the integrated model remains healthy. Sales grew modestly, while EBITDA and profit increased much faster. Decathlon has demonstrated global operating leverage. India must now reproduce it while investing heavily.

RELIANCE MAY COPY THE BOX, BUT THE MOAT IS BEHIND IT

Reliance Retail has reportedly considered a sports format using 8,000-to-10,000-square-foot stores, potentially creating India’s first scaled domestic challenge to Decathlon’s one-stop proposition.

Retail space is the most visible part of Decathlon’s model and probably the easiest to imitate.

The harder assets sit behind the shop floor: product designers across many disciplines, supplier relationships, private labels, quality testing, global procurement volumes, inventory data and the ability to offer a complete sport at several price levels.

A rival can fill a store with sporting goods. Reproducing Decathlon’s value equation requires enough scale to control design, sourcing and price without making the assortment feel cheap or generic.

Digital-first Indian brands create pressure from another direction. Boldfit, Cult.fit and Flexnest can concentrate on fast-growing categories without maintaining equipment for dozens of smaller sports. Specialist labels can speak more credibly to committed users. Marketplaces can offer every global brand on one screen.

Decathlon faces competition from the department store, the expert boutique and the infinite digital shelf at the same time.

THE NEXT ₹5,500 CRORE WILL BE HARDER THAN THE FIRST

Decathlon’s Indian achievement is already significant. It did not wait for a mature sporting culture and then sell into it. Its assortment, prices and stores helped create that culture by lowering the anxiety and expense of beginning.

That engine can still carry the company into smaller cities and institutions. Manufacturing can improve availability and strengthen India’s role inside the global group. Digital channels can place Decathlon within reach before a local store arrives.

None of those paths alone explains how revenue reaches ₹10,000 crore by FY30.

The target requires Decathlon to grow approximately five times faster than its annualised rate since FY23. Store expansion must be accompanied by better sales from existing outlets. B2B must grow without depressing margins. Local manufacturing must improve economics rather than merely add capacity. KIPRUN and the other expert brands must persuade serious athletes to spend more without pushing beginners away.

Decathlon has already shown that an Indian consumer will buy a sports product without a famous logo. Its next growth phase depends on whether that consumer will eventually consider the unfamiliar logo famous.